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Abstract The descending projections from motor cortex
share many features with top-down or backward connec-
tions in visual cortex; for example, corticospinal projec-
tions originate in infragranular layers, are highly divergent
and (along with descending cortico-cortical projections)
target cells expressing NMDA receptors. This is somewhat
paradoxical because backward modulatory characteristics
would not be expected of driving motor command signals.
We resolve this apparent paradox using a functional char-
acterisation of the motor system based on Helmholtz’s
ideas about perception; namely, that perception is inference
on the causes of visual sensations. We explain behaviour in
terms of inference on the causes of proprioceptive sensa-
tions. This explanation appeals to active inference, in
which higher cortical levels send descending propriocep-
tive predictions, rather than motor commands. This process
mirrors perceptual inference in sensory cortex, where
descending connections convey predictions, while
ascending connections convey prediction errors. The ana-
tomical substrate of this recurrent message passing is a
hierarchical system consisting of functionally asymmetric
driving (ascending) and modulatory (descending) connec-
tions: an arrangement that we show is almost exactly
recapitulated in the motor system, in terms of its laminar,
topographic and physiological characteristics. This per-
spective casts classical motor reflexes as minimising
prediction errors and may provide a principled explanation
for why motor cortex is agranular.
Keywords Active inference  Free energy  Hierarchy 
Motor control  Reflexes
Introduction
This paper tries to explain the functional anatomy of the
motor system from a theoretical perspective. In particular,
we address the apparently paradoxical observation that
descending projections from the motor cortex are, ana-
tomically and physiologically, more like backward con-
nections in the visual cortex than the corresponding
forward connections (Shipp 2005). Furthermore, there are
some unique characteristics of motor cortex, such as its
agranular cytoarchitecture, which remain unexplained. We
propose that these features of motor projections are con-
sistent with recent formulations of motor control in terms
of active inference. In brief, we suggest that if sensory
systems perform hierarchal perceptual inference, where
descending signals are predictions of sensory inputs, then
the functional anatomy of the motor system can be
understood in exactly the same way, down to the level of
classical motor reflex arcs. We develop this argument in
five sections.
In the first section, we review the concept of perceptual
inference from a Helmholtzian perspective, and describe
how it can be instantiated by minimising prediction error
using a hierarchical generative model. This treatment leads
to the established notion of predictive coding in visual
synthesis. Predictive coding schemes suggest that ascend-
ing and descending connections in cortical hierarchies must
have distinct anatomical and physiological characteristics,
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which are remarkably consistent with empirical observa-
tions. In the second section, we introduce active inference
as a generalisation of predictive coding, in which move-
ment is considered to suppress proprioceptive prediction
error. We discuss how active inference could have
important implications for the organisation of the motor
system, and illustrate the implicit mechanisms using the
classical ‘knee-jerk’ reflex. The active inference view dif-
fers from the conventional (computational) views of motor
control in conceptual and anatomical terms. Conceptually,
under active inference, predictions about proprioceptive
input are passed down the hierarchy; not motor commands.
Anatomically, descending or efferent connections in active
inference should be of the modulatory backward-type.
Conversely, conventional motor control schemes would
predict that descending motor command signals should be
of the driving forward-type.
In the third section, we describe forward-type ascending
and backward-type descending connections in the visual
system, and use these features to furnish ‘tests’ for forward
and backward connections in the motor system. In the
subsequent section, we apply these tests to central and
peripheral connections in the motor hierarchy, and find that
descending connections are backward-type, and ascending
connections are forward-type. This means the motor sys-
tem conforms to the predictions of active inference. In the
final section, we discuss the implications of this charac-
terisation of the motor system, with a particular focus on
the fact that primary motor cortex lacks a granular cell
layer. Before we begin, we must clarify our nomenclature.
This paper refers to extrinsic connections between
cortical areas (and subcortical structures and the spinal
cord) as afferent, efferent, ascending, descending, forward,
backward, driving and modulatory. We use ‘ascending’
(resp. afferent) and ‘descending’ (resp. efferent) in refer-
ence to the hierarchical direction of corticocortical and
corticofugal projections: towards and away from high-level
(association) cortex, respectively. We use ‘forward’ and
‘backward’ to describe the characteristics of projections,
which can be laminar, topographic or physiological. For
example, physiologically, ‘forward’ projections are ‘driv-
ing’ while ‘backward’ projections are ‘modulatory’. In
sensory systems, ascending projections have forward-type,
driving characteristics, and descending projections have
backward-type, modulatory characteristics. This relation-
ship does not necessarily hold in the motor system. The
aim of this paper is to establish whether ‘descending’
motor connections are ‘forward’ or ‘backward’ and
understand this designation in functional terms. If the
theory behind active inference is broadly correct, then all
projections of ‘ascending’ direction will have ‘forward’
characteristics, because their function is to convey pre-
diction errors. Conversely, all projections of ‘descending’
direction will have ‘backward’ characteristics, because
their function is to convey predictions.
We stress that we are not looking to impose an either/or
classification upon every projection in the nervous system as
regards ascending versus descending, forward versus back-
ward and prediction error versus prediction. These are false
partitions: for example—regarding the direction of projec-
tions—hierarchies also contain lateral connections (that are
neither ascending nor descending, and with intermediate
anatomical and physiological characteristics). Regarding the
function of projections—not every projection in a predictive
coding hierarchy conveys either a prediction or a prediction
error: for example, the information carried by primary sen-
sory afferents only becomes a prediction error signal once it
encounters a prediction (which may be at the thalamus or in
the spinal cord; see Fig. 9).
Perception and predictive coding
Hermann von Helmholtz was the first to propose that the
brain does not represent sensory images per se, but the
causes of those images and, as these causes cannot be
perceived directly, they must be inferred from sensory
impressions (Helmholtz 1860/1962). In his study of optics,
he noted that the richness of the brain’s visual perceptions
contrasted with the signals coming from retinal nerves,
which he felt could only differ in hue, intensity and retinal
position. From these signals, the brain is able to perceive
depth and spatial position, and maintain the size and colour
constancy of objects. Helmholtz summarised this as, ‘‘We
always think we see such objects before us as would have
to be present in order to bring about the same retinal
images’’—we perceive the world as it is, and not as it is
sensed. He concluded that to derive the causes of a retinal
image from the image itself, the brain must perform
unconscious inference.
How might such inferences be performed? What follows
is a pre´cis of arguments covered in depth elsewhere
(Friston 2003). As Helmholtz pointed out, perception
entails recognising the causes of sensation. In order to
perceive, therefore, the brain must embody a generative
model of how causes generate sensations. By simply
inverting such a model (such that sensations generate
causes), it can infer the most likely causes of its sensory
data. The problem is that there are a multitude of inter-
acting causes that give rise to the same sensory impres-
sions. In vision, for instance, both object size and distance
from the observer affect retinal image size. In these cases,
straightforward inversion of the forward model becomes an
ill-posed problem.
The solution to this ill-posed problem is to use a gen-
erative (forward) model that contains prior beliefs about
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how causes interact: e.g. that objects maintain a constant
size irrespective of their distance from the observer. This
inferential process is fundamentally Bayesian, as it
involves the construction of a posterior probability density
from a prior distribution over causes and sensory data. The
brain cannot generate all of its prior beliefs de novo;
instead it must estimate them from sensory data, which
calls for empirical Bayes. Empirical Bayes uses a hierar-
chical generative model, in which estimates of causes at
one level act as (empirical) priors for the level below. In
this way, the brain can recapitulate the hierarchical causal
structure of the environment: for example, the meaning of a
phrase (encoded in semantic areas) predicts words (enco-
ded in lexical areas), which predicts letters (encoded in
ventral occipital areas), which predict oriented lines and
edges (encoded in visual areas). All these hierarchically
deployed explanations for visual input are internally con-
sistent and distributed at multiple levels of description,
where higher levels provide empirical priors that finesse
the ill-posed inversion of the brain’s generative model.
A hierarchical generative model can be used to
approximate the causes of sensory input by minimising the
difference between the observed sensory data and the
sensory data predicted or generated by the model (and
indeed differences at all higher levels). These differences
are known as prediction error, and the inversion scheme is
generally called predictive coding (Rao and Ballard 1999).
In predictive coding, backward projections from one hier-
archical level to its subordinate level furnish predictions of
the lower level’s representations, while reciprocal forward
projections convey prediction errors that report the differ-
ence between the representation and the prediction
(Mumford 1994). Error signals received by the higher level
are then used to correct its representation so that its pre-
dictions improve. This recurrent exchange of signals con-
tinues until prediction error is minimised, at which point
the hierarchical representation becomes a Bayes-optimal
estimate of the (hierarchical) causes of sensory input.
The idea that the brain uses a predictive coding scheme
has become increasingly popular, as evidence for such a
scheme has accumulated in various modalities; e.g. Rao
and Ballard (1999); Pessiglione et al. (2006); Henson and
Gagnepain (2010); McNally et al. (2011); Rauss et al.
(2011). In summary, predictive coding schemes suggest
that descending predictions are subtracted from sensory
input to generate an ascending prediction error, which
corrects the prediction. This subtraction must be effected
by local circuitry: the backward connections that carry
descending predictions, like all long-range corticocortical
(extrinsic) connections, originate in pyramidal cells and are
excitatory. It is therefore generally assumed that the sup-
pression of prediction error units is mediated by inhibitory
interneurons (whose intrinsic connections are confined to
each hierarchical level). The action of backward connec-
tions on layer 6 could be one such mechanism, as opto-
genetic manipulation of layer 6 pyramidal neurons in
mouse V1 by Olsen et al. (2012) has demonstrated that
excitation of layer 6 exerts a suppressive effect on neural
activity in layers 2–5 (apart from fast-spiking inhibitory
neurons in these layers, that showed enhanced activity).
The sign-reversal effected by this backward pathway is
clearly consistent with the tenets of predictive coding.
Another potential mechanism for the suppression of pre-
diction error is an inhibitory action of layer 1 activation on
layer 2/3 pyramidal neurons (Shlosberg et al. 2006).
Additional findings from non-invasive human studies
suggest that top-down influences suppress overall activity
in lower areas, when that activity can be predicted (Murray
et al. 2002, 2006; Harrison et al. 2007; Summerfield et al.
2008, 2011). This suppression has been proposed as the
basis of repetition suppression and phenomena such as the
mismatch negativity in electrophysiology (Garrido et al.
2009; Vuust et al. 2009).
If the brain implements predictive coding, then its
functional architecture ought to have particular attributes.
These include: (1) a hierarchical organisation with (2)
reciprocal connections between areas (conveying predic-
tions and prediction errors) that are (3) divergent (because
a cause has multiple consequences) and (4) functionally
asymmetrical. The functional asymmetry is important
because descending predictions have to embody nonlin-
earities in the generative model (e.g. to model visual
occlusion) that require them to interact or modulate each
other, whereas ascending connections that drive higher
representations do not. These attributes are indeed char-
acteristic of cortical architectures (Friston 2005). The
functional asymmetry of ascending and descending con-
nections is a critical issue for this paper, to which we shall
return in the next section.
Active inference, predictive coding and reflexes
So far we have discussed hierarchical models as they relate to
perceptual inference, but we have made no reference to
motor control. Before doing so, we must turn to a wider
theory under which predictive coding can be subsumed: the
free energy principle. This principle has been described
extensively elsewhere (e.g. Friston et al. 2006; Friston 2010),
and is summarised below. In brief, we will see that the
Helmholtzian inference and predictive coding are only one
side of the coin, in that action or behaviour also suppresses
prediction errors. This rests on equipping the brain with
motor reflexes that enable movement to suppress (proprio-
ceptive) prediction errors. The free energy principle itself
explains why it is necessary to minimise prediction errors.
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Free energy is a concept borrowed from statistical
physics. It is a quantity that bounds the surprise (negative
log probability) of some (sensory) data, given a model of
how those data were generated. The free energy principle
explains how self-organising systems (like the brain)
maintain their sensory states within physiological bounds,
in the face of constant environmental flux. Such systems
are obliged to minimise their sensory surprise, as this
maximises the probability of remaining within physiolog-
ical bounds (by definition). Although organisms cannot
evaluate surprise directly, they can minimise a bound on
surprise called (variational) free energy. Crucially, under
some simplifying assumptions, free energy corresponds to
prediction error. This is intuitive, in the sense that we are
only surprised when our predictions are violated.
The brain can minimise prediction error in one of two
ways. It can either change its predictions to better cohere
with sensory input, or change the sampling of the envi-
ronment such that sensory samples conform to predictions.
The former process corresponds to perceptual inference—
discussed in the previous section as predictive coding—the
latter to action: together, they constitute ‘active inference’
(Friston et al. 2010). The free energy principle thus dictates
that the perceptual and motor systems should not be
regarded as separate but instead as a single active inference
machine that tries to predict its sensory input in all
domains: visual, auditory, somatosensory, interoceptive
and, in the case of the motor system, proprioceptive (cf.
Censor et al.’s (2012) analysis of common learning
mechanisms in the sensory and motor systems). In what
follows, we look at the implications of this for the so-
matomotor system, in which we include sensory afferents
relevant to motor control (e.g. proprioceptors), all motor
efferents, and associated cortical and subcortical systems.
Active inference has the following important implications
for the somatomotor system (also see Fig. 1):
• In common with the rest of the central nervous system,
it should embody a hierarchical generative model that
enables the minimisation of prediction errors by its
(descending) predictions.
• Descending messages in the somatomotor system are
therefore predictions of proprioceptive input and not
motor commands.
• In the somatosensory system, predictions of sensory
input are corrected by prediction errors in the usual way
during exteroception (although note that some of these
somatosensory predictions will come from the somato-
motor system, e.g. cutaneous sensations during grip-
ping—see the ‘‘Discussion’’). In the somatomotor
system, however, proprioceptive predictions should
not be corrected but fulfilled, by the automatic periph-
eral transformation of proprioceptive prediction errors
into movement. The neuronal encoding of predic-
tions—in terms of the activity of specific neuronal
populations—and the transformations—mediated
through synaptic connections—conform to the neuro-
biologically plausible schemes considered for predic-
tive coding in the brain (for details, see Friston et al.
2010). A proprioceptive prediction error can be gener-
ated at the level of the spinal cord by the comparison of
proprioceptive predictions (from motor cortex) and
proprioceptive input. Sources of proprioceptive input
include muscle spindles (via Ia and II afferents), Golgi
tendon organs (via Ib afferents), and articular and
cutaneous receptors. The prediction error can then
activate the motor neuron to contract the muscle in
which the spindles—or other receptors—are sited: this
is the classical reflex arc (Figs. 1, 2). In short,
peripheral proprioceptive prediction errors are (or
become) motor commands.
• If both systems are minimising prediction error,
descending hierarchical projections in the motor cortex
should share the laminar, topographic and physiological
characteristics of backward connections in exterocep-
tive (sensory) systems.
The second point above raises the question: what exactly
is the difference between a top-down prediction of pro-
prioceptive input and a top-down motor command? In
principle a motor command is a signal that drives a muscle
(motor unit) and should not show context specificity: the
command to one motor unit should not depend upon the
commands to another. In contrast, a prediction of propri-
oceptive input encodes the consequences of a movement
rather than its cause.1 Given that these consequences are a
nonlinear function of their causes, the proprioceptive pre-
dictions for several motor units should be interdependent.
For example, proprioceptive consequences are modulated
by the current position of the limb. M1 efferents do in fact
have the characteristics of proprioceptive predictions:
stimulation of points in M1 activates either biceps or tri-
ceps differentially, according to the degree of flexion of the
monkey’s arm (Graziano 2006). Furthermore, prolonged
(500 ms) stimulation of M1 causes movement of a mon-
key’s arm to specific locations, no matter what position the
arm started in (Graziano 2006). This stimulation regime is
controversial (Strick 2002), as it is non-physiological and
stimulus-driven activity has been shown to ‘hijack’ all
activity in the resulting M1 output (Griffin et al. 2011).
1 Another way to put this is that command signals live in a space of
motor effectors, whose dimensionality is equal to the number of
(extrafusal) neuromuscular junctions—this is the output of the motor
neurons. Predictions live in the space of sensory receptors, whose
dimensionality is equal to the number of primary afferents—this is
input to the motor neurons.
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Nevertheless, one can still argue that under this non-
physiological stimulation, the M1 layer 5 pyramidal cells’
output encodes the goal of the movement and not the motor
commands for generating that movement (because the
necessary commands to reach a given location would be
different at different starting positions). Whether physio-
logical M1 activity can be said to encode goals or motor
commands is reviewed in the ‘‘Discussion’’.
In brief, under active inference, descending signals do
not enact motor commands directly, but specify the desired
consequences of a movement.2 These descending signals
are either predictions of proprioceptive input or predictions
of precision or gain (see Fig. 2 and the ‘‘Discussion’’ for
explication of the latter).
Our focus in this paper is on the functional anatomy of
the motor system, considered in light of active inference.
Although we have stressed the importance of hierarchical
message passing in predictive coding, we shall not consider
in detail where top-down predictions and (empirical) priors
come from. Priors in the motor system are considered to be
established in the same way as in perceptual systems: some
would be genetically specified and present from birth (e.g.
innate reflexes), while most would be learned during
development. The easiest way to demonstrate their exis-
tence empirically is to show their effects on evoked
responses to stimuli; i.e. their contribution to prediction
error responses. In perception, it has been shown that the
mismatch negativity response is best characterised as that
of a predictive coding network to a change in a stimulus
about which prior beliefs have been formed (Garrido et al.
2009). There are myriad of other examples of how learning
priors about stimuli changes the responses they evoke: e.g.
for visual (Summerfield et al. 2008; Summerfield and
Koechlin 2008), auditory (Pincze et al. 2002), and
somatosensory (Akatsuka et al. 2007) stimuli. As the brain
learns these changing probabilities, they can be expressed
in the motor domain as increased speed and accuracy of
motor responses (den Ouden et al. 2010). There is also a
literature which demonstrates the effects of learning priors
on single cell responses in electrophysiology (e.g. Rao and
Ballard 1999; Spratling 2010).
The idea that the motor cortex specifies consequences
of, rather than instructions for, movements is not a new
one. More than half a century ago, Merton (1953) proposed
the servo hypothesis, which held that descending motor
signals activated gamma motor neurons, specifying the
desired length of the muscle. This changed the sensitivity
of their muscle spindles, thereby activating alpha motor
neurons via the tonic stretch reflex, which causes the
muscle to contract until its length reached the point spec-
ified by the gamma motor neurons. The servo hypothesis
assumed that while the descending command remains
constant, muscle length will also remain constant, because
changes in load will be compensated for by the tonic
stretch reflex. The servo hypothesis did not survive because
gamma and alpha motor neurons were shown to activate
simultaneously, not sequentially (Granit 1955), and the
gain of the tonic stretch reflex was shown to be insufficient
for maximal increases in muscle force with minimal dis-
placement (Vallbo 1970).
The successor to the servo hypothesis is the equilibrium
point hypothesis—or more properly, threshold control
theory (Feldman and Levin 2009), which proposes that
descending signals to both alpha and gamma motor neu-
rons specify the relationship between muscle force and
muscle length—by setting the threshold of the tonic stretch
reflex—such that a given load will result in the muscle
reaching the specific length at which its force matches the
external load: the ‘equilibrium point’. For a constant
descending signal, changes in this external load would
result in predictable changes in muscle length, as it is the
relationship between force and length which descending
signals dictate, not the absolute length (unlike the servo
hypothesis).
Threshold control theory and active inference are clo-
sely related and consensual in several respects. First, both
eschew the complex calculation of motor commands by the
central nervous system (CNS); instead, they merely ask the
CNS to specify the sensory conditions under which motor
commands should emerge—through the operation of clas-
sical reflex arcs. In threshold control theory, the sensory
conditions specified by the CNS are the threshold positions
at which muscles begin to be recruited in order to achieve a
narrow subset of equilibrium points. In active inference,
they are the sensory consequences of movement, which
then undergo automatic peripheral transformation into
motor commands.
Second, neither theory holds that redundancy problems
in motor control require an optimality criterion to choose
between competing trajectories (see Friston 2011 for fur-
ther discussion). Third, both theories propose that the
2 As noted by our reviewers, predictions of muscle torque (reported
by Ib afferents) might be construed as motor commands, not
proprioceptive consequences. The key point here is that the Ib
inhibitory interneurons that receive descending predictions do not just
receive torque information from Ib afferents, but also inputs from
muscle spindles via Ia afferents, articular afferents and low-threshold
afferent fibres from cutaneous receptors. It is therefore most accurate
to describe the descending prediction of Ib activity as not simply a
‘prediction of torque’, but a ‘prediction of torque in a particular
context’. It is this contextual aspect of the prediction that differen-
tiates it from a motor command, which would not be context-
dependent. Furthermore, under active inference, actions minimise
sensory prediction error not just on position, but also on velocity,
acceleration, jerk, smoothness, etc. (Friston et al. 2010). This means
proprioceptive predictions will necessarily have a torque component,
but they cannot generate this torque: this is the job of the spinal reflex
arc.
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sensory conditions under which motor commands emerge
are specified in an extrinsic frame of reference—as
opposed to an intrinsic (muscle based) frame of reference.
This enables top-down predictions about the consequences
of movement in other sensory modalities, which can be
regarded as corollary discharge. Crucially, this obviates the
need for a complex (ill posed) transformation of efference
copy from intrinsic to extrinsic frames (Feldman 2008).
There are two essential differences between the theories.
First, active inference is grounded in predictive coding, and
therefore holds that descending signals are predictions of
the sensory consequences of movement. This is in contrast
to threshold control theory, which does not predict pro-
prioceptive or torque-related states—the threshold position
is not the movement ‘prediction’ and deviation from this
position is not a ‘prediction error’—instead, the threshold
position is a tool for the production of actions and the
interpretation of (otherwise ambiguous) kinaesthetic
information.
Second, in threshold control theory, changing descend-
ing signals lead (via changing threshold positions) to new
equilibrium points that are defined in terms of position and
torque. In active inference, descending signals specify
sensory trajectories whose fixed point is the equilibrium
point; i.e. the dynamics of the movement (including
velocity, acceleration, jerk, etc), not just the position and
torque at an end point (Friston et al. 2010).
The last of the four implications of active inference for
the nervous system listed above motivates the following
hypothesis, which we address in the remainder of this
paper.
Under active inference, descending projections in the
motor hierarchy convey proprioceptive predictions and
therefore should have comparable laminar, topographic and
physiological characteristics as backward projections in
exteroceptive (e.g. visual) hierarchies.
Conversely, conventional models of the somatomotor
system, as exemplified in the motor control literature
(Shadmehr et al. 2010), consider descending connections to
deliver driving command signals and therefore to be of the
forward type. The conventional motor control model is
taken here to treat the brain as an input–output system that
mediates stimulus–response mappings—in which sensory
signals are passed forwards to sensory to association to
motor cortex and then to the spinal cord and cranial nerve
nuclei as motor commands. In computational motor control
616 Brain Struct Funct (2013) 218:611–643
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this usually involves the use of forward and inverse mod-
els, where the inverse model supplies the motor command
and the forward model converts efference copy into sen-
sory predictions (Wolpert and Kawato 1998). These pre-
dictions are used to optimise the estimated state of the
motor plant required by the inverse model (see Fig. 1 for a
schematic that compares active inference and motor control
schemes).
In the last 10 years, optimal motor control has become a
dominant model of motor control (Scott 2004). This model
was based on influential work by Todorov and Jordan
(2002, 2004), who showed the selective use of sensory
feedback to correct deviations that interfere with task goals
could account for several unexplained effects in motor
control, such as the variability of task-irrelevant movement
qualities. The idea that motor cortex could use sensory
feedback contrasted with the earlier purely ‘feed-forward’
serial model of motor control (see Fig. 1). The optimal
control model has some commonalities with the active
inference view, in that both propose that sensory inputs to
motor cortex finesse its output: in optimal control theory,
these inputs are state estimates that the optimal controller
uses to optimise motor commands. Under active inference,
these inputs are proprioceptive and somatosensory predic-
tion errors, which a forward model uses to derive
proprioceptive predictions. However, there are profound
differences between the two: a crucial theoretical differ-
ence—explained at length in Friston (2011)—is that opti-
mal control models generate optimal motor commands by
minimising a cost function associated with movement. In
active inference schemes, the cost functions are replaced
by prior beliefs about desired trajectories in extrinsic
frames of reference, which emerge naturally during hier-
archical perceptual inference.
Of interest in the present context, is an important dif-
ference between the signals descending the spinal cord in
the two models: under active inference these are proprio-
ceptive predictions, whereas in optimal control—as in
earlier serial models—these signals are motor commands.
In neurobiological terms, predictions must have modula-
tory or non-linear context-dependent (backward-type)
properties, whereas commands must have driving, linear,
context-independent (forward-type) properties. We assume
here, that predictions (or commands) are communicated
through the firing rate modulation of descending efferents
of upper motor neurons in M1. The key difference between
predictions and commands is that the former have yet to be
converted (inverted) into command signals that fulfil the
predictions (goals). This conversion necessarily entails
context-sensitivity—for example, producing different
Fig. 1 Motor control, optimal control and active inference: these simplified schematics ignore the contributions of spinal circuits and subcortical
structures; and omit many hierarchical levels (especially on the sensory side). M1, S1, M2 and S2 signify primary and secondary motor and
sensory cortex (S2 is area 5, not ‘SII’), while As signifies prefrontal association cortex. Red arrows denote driving ‘forward’ projections, and
black arrows modulatory ‘backward’ projections. Afferent somatosensory projections are in blue. a-MN and c-MN signify alpha- and gamma
motor neuron output. The dashed black arrows in the optimal control scheme show what is different about optimal control compared with earlier
serial models of the motor system: namely, the presence of sensory feedback connections to motor cortices. Under the active inference
(predictive coding) scheme, all connections are reciprocal, with backward-type descending connections and forward-type ascending connections.
They are descending from motor to sensory areas because the motor areas are above somatosensory areas in the hierarchy (see Fig. 4a).
Anatomical implications The motor control and active inference models have identical connection types in the sensory system, but opposite
connection types in the motor system (examples are indicated with asterisks). The nature of these connections should therefore disambiguate
between the two models. The active inference model predicts descending motor connections should be backward-type, while conventional motor
control schemes require the descending connections to convey driving motor commands. Predictions and prediction errors In the active
inference scheme, backward connections convey predictions, and the forward connections deliver prediction errors. In the motor control scheme,
the descending forward connections from M1 convey motor commands computed by an inverse model for generating movements and efference
copy required by a forward model, for predicting its sensory consequences. The classical reflex arc The active inference model illustrates how the
classical reflex arc performs an inverse mapping from sensory predictions to action (motor commands). The (classical) reflex arcs we have in
mind are a nuanced version of Granit’s (1963) proposal that, in voluntary movements, a reference value is set by descending signals, which act on
both the alpha and gamma motor neurons—known as alpha-gamma coactivation (Matthews 1959; Feldman and Orlovsky 1972). In this setting,
the rate of firing of alpha motor neurons is set (by proprioceptive prediction errors) to produce the desired (predicted) shortening of the muscle,
though innervation of extrafusal muscle fibres; while the rate of firing of gamma motor neurons optimises the sensitivity or gain of muscle
spindles, though innervation of intrafusal muscle fibres. Note the emphasis here is on alpha motor neurons as carrying proprioceptive prediction
errors derived from the comparison of descending predictions (about movement trajectories) and primary afferents (see Fig. 2). In this setting,
gamma motor neurons are considered to provide context-sensitive modulation or gain of primary afferents (e.g. ensure they report changes in
muscle length and velocity within their dynamic range). Forward and inverse models Conventional (computational) motor control theory uses
the notion of forward–inverse models to explain how the brain generates actions from desired sensory states (the inverse model) and predicts the
sensory consequences of action (the forward model). In these schemes, the inverse model has to generate a motor command from sensory cues—
a complex transformation—and then a forward model uses an efference copy of this command to generate a predicted proprioceptive outcome
called corollary discharge (Wolpert and Kawato 1998). In active inference a forward or generative model generates both proprioceptive and
sensory predictions—a simple transformation—and an inverse mapping converts a proprioceptive prediction into movement. This is a relatively
well-posed problem and could be implemented by spinal reflex arcs (Friston et al. 2010). In the terminology of this paper, optimal control’s
inverse model maps from an extrinsic frame to an intrinsic frame and from an intrinsic frame to motor commands. The inverse mapping in active
inference is simply from the intrinsic frame to motor commands. This figure omits the significant contribution of the cerebellum to the forward
model
b
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Fig. 2 Generation of spinal prediction errors and the classical reflex arc.
This schematic provides examples of spinal cord circuitry that are
consistent with its empirical features and could mediate proprioceptive
predictions. They all distinguish between descending proprioceptive
predictions of (Ia and Ib) primary afferents and predictions of the
precision of the ensuing prediction error. Predictions of precision
optimise the gain of prediction error by facilitating descending predic-
tions (through NMDA receptor activation) and the afferents predicted
(through gamma motor neuron drive to intrafusal muscle fibres). This
necessarily entails alpha-gamma coactivation and renders descending
predictions (of precision) facilitatory. The prediction errors per se are
simply the difference between predictions and afferent input. The left
panel considers this to be mediated by convergent monosynaptic
(AMPA-R mediated) descending projections (‘CM’ neurons) and
inhibition, mediated by the inhibitory interneurons of Ib (Rudomin and
Schmidt 1999) or II (Bannatyne et al. 2006) afferents. The middle and
right panels consider the actions of Ia afferents, which drive (or
disinhibit) alpha motor neurons, in opposition to (inhibitory) descending
predictions. The middle panel is based on Hultborn et al. (1987) and the
right panel on Lindstro¨m (1973). Note that corticospinal neurons synapse
directly with spinal motor neurons and indirectly via interneurons
(Lemon 2008). When a reflex is elicited by stretching a tendon, sudden
lengthening of the (fusimotor) muscle spindle stretch receptors sends
proprioceptive signals (via primary sensory Ia neurons) to the dorsal root
of the spinal cord. These sensory signals excite (disinhibit) alpha motor
neurons, which contract (extrafusal) muscle fibres and return the stretch
receptors to their original state. The activation of alpha motor neurons by
sensory afferents can be monosynaptic or polysynaptic. In the case of
monosynaptic (simple) reflex arcs (middle panel), a prediction error is
generated by inhibition of the alpha motor neurons by descending
predictions from upper motor neurons. In polysynaptic (spinal) reflexes,
Ia inhibitory interneurons may report prediction errors (right panel). Ia
inhibitory interneurons are inhibited by sensory afferents (via glycine)
and this inhibition is countered by descending corticospinal efferents
(Lindstro¨m 1973). In this polysynaptic case, reflex muscle fibre
contractions are elicited by disinhibition of alpha motor neuron drive.
Crucially, precisely the same muscle contractions can result from
changes in descending (corticospinal) predictions. This could involve
suspension of descending (glutamatergic) activation either of presynaptic
inhibition of Ia afferents (Hultborn et al. 1987; reviewed by Rudomin and
Schmidt 1999)—not shown—or of Ia inhibitory interneurons, and
disinhibition of alpha motor neuron activity. The ensuing mismatch or
prediction error is resolved by muscle contraction and a reduction in
stretch receptor discharge rates. In both reflexes and voluntary
movement, under active inference the motor system is enslaved to fulfil
descending proprioceptive predictions. As Feldman (2009) notes,
‘‘posture-stabilizing mechanisms (i.e. classical reflex arcs) do not resist
but assist the movement’’ [italics in original]: threshold control theory
does this by changing the threshold position, active inference by changing
proprioceptive predictions. The key aspect of this circuitry is that it places
descending corticospinal efferents and primary afferents in opposition,
through inhibitory interneurons. The role of inhibitory interneurons is
often portrayed in terms of a reciprocal inhibitory control of agonist and
antagonist muscles. However, in the setting of predictive coding, they
play a simpler and more fundamental role in the formation of prediction
errors. This role is remarkably consistent with computational architec-
tures in the cortex and thalamus: for example, top-down projections in the
sensory hierarchies activate inhibitory neurons in layer 1 which then
suppress (superficial) pyramidal cells, thought to encode prediction error
(Shlosberg et al. 2006). Note that there are many issues we have ignored
in these schematics, such as the role of polysynaptic transformations,
nonlinear dendritic integration, presynaptic inhibition by cutaneous
afferents, neuromodulatory effects, the role of Renshaw cells, and other
types of primary afferents
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command signals at the spinal level, depending upon limb
position. Another difference lies in the nature of the sen-
sory input to motor cortex: under active inference, these
ascending signals must be sensory prediction errors (in
predictive coding architectures, ascending signals cannot
be predictions), whereas in optimal control these inputs to
the optimal controller (inverse model) are state estimates,
i.e. sensory predictions.
The analysis above means that characterising somato-
motor connections as forward or backward should disam-
biguate between schemes based on active inference and
optimal motor control. In the next section, we describe the
characteristics of forward (ascending) and backward
(descending) projections in sensory hierarchies, and then
apply these characteristics as tests to motor projections in
the subsequent section.
Forward and backward connections
In this section, we review the characteristics of ascending
and descending projections in the visual system, as this is
the paradigmatic sensory hierarchy. The characteristics of
ascending visual projections will become tests of forward
projections (i.e. those conveying prediction errors) and the
characteristics of descending visual projections will con-
stitute tests of backward projections (i.e. those conveying
predictions). These characteristics can be grouped into four
areas; laminar, topographic, physiological and pharmaco-
logical (also see Table 1).
Laminar characteristics
The cerebral neocortex consists of six layers of neurons,
defined by differences in neuronal composition (pyramidal
or stellate excitatory neurons, and numerous inhibitory
classes) and packing density (Shipp 2007). Layer 4 is
known as the ‘internal granular layer’ or just ‘granular
layer’ (due to its appearance), and the layers above and
below it are known as ‘supragranular’ and ‘infragranular’,
respectively. Since the late 1970s (e.g. Rockland and
Pandya 1979), it has been known that extrinsic cortico-
cortical (ignoring thalamocortical) connections between
areas in the visual system have distinct laminar charac-
teristics, which depend on whether they are ascending
(forward) or descending (backward).
Felleman and Van Essen (1991) surveyed 156 cortico-
cortical pathways and specified criteria by which








Descending connections in motor cortex
(and periphery)
Origin Supra  infragranular Bilaminar
(Supra [ infragranular)
Infra [ supragranular Bilaminar (Supra [ infragranular), but
of a lower S:I ratio than the ascending
connections*
Termination Layer 4 (granular) Multilaminar in higher motor
areas; layer 3 in S1 to M1
Concentrated in
layers 1 and 6,
avoiding layer 4
Multilaminar, concentrated in layer 1
and avoiding lower layer 3 (or layer 4
in sensory cortex)
Axonal properties Rarely bifurcate,
patchy terminations
Not described Commonly bifurcate,
widely distributed
terminations
Motor neurons innervate hundreds of
muscle fibres in a uniform distribution;
corticospinal axons innervate many




S1 to M1 and peripheral
proprioceptive connections




M1 to periphery very divergent and
convergent; cingulate, SMA and PMC
to M1 less somatotopic
Proportion Fewer See descending column Greater Greater from M1 to the periphery, areas








S1 connections to M1 more
driving than PMC
connections; M1’s







NMDA receptors in supragranular
distribution; 50 % of M1’s descending
input is via NMDA-Rs; F5 has a
powerful facilitatory effect on M1
outputs but is not itself driving
These are used as tests of the connection type of ascending (afferent) and descending (efferent) projections in motor cortex and the periphery. As
can be seen from columns 3 and 5, ascending connections in motor cortex are forward (driving), and descending connections are backward
(modulatory); the one exception (marked *) has some mitigating properties, as discussed in the text (see ‘‘Laminar characteristics’’ in ‘‘Motor
projections’’). This pattern is predicted by our active inference model of somatomotor organisation
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projections could be classified as forward, backward or
lateral. They defined forward projections as originating
predominantly (i.e.[70 % cells of origin) in supragranular
layers, or occasionally with a bilaminar pattern (meaning
\70 % either supra- or infragranular, but excluding layer 4
itself). Forward projections terminate preferentially in layer
4. Backward projections are predominantly infragranular or
bilaminar in origin with terminations in layers 1 and 6
(especially the former), and always evading layer 4 (see
Table 1). Further refinements to this scheme suggest the
operation of a ‘distance rule’, whereby forward and back-
ward laminar characteristics become more accentuated for
connections traversing two or more tiers in the hierarchy
(Barone et al. 2000).
Topographic characteristics
Salin and Bullier (1995) reviewed a large body of evidence
concerning the microscopic and macroscopic topography
of corticocortical connections, and how these structural
properties contribute to their function; e.g. their receptive
fields. In cat area 17, for example, \3 % of forward pro-
jecting neurons have axons which bifurcate to separate
cortical destinations. Conversely, backward projections to
areas 17 and 18 include as much as 30 % bifurcating axons
(Bullier et al. 1984; Ferrer et al. 1992). A similar rela-
tionship exists in visual areas in the monkey (Salin and
Bullier 1995).
Rockland and Drash (1996) contrasted a subset of
backward connections from late visual areas (TE and TF)
to primary visual cortex with typical forward connections
in the macaque. The forward connections concentrated
their synaptic terminals in 1–3 arbours of around 0.25 mm
in diameter, whilst backward connections were distributed
over a ‘‘wand-like array’’ of neurons, with numerous ter-
minal fields stretching over 4–10 mm, and in one case,
21 mm (Fig. 3b). This very diffuse pattern was only found
in around 10 % of backward projections, but it was not
found in any forward projections.
These microscopic properties of backward connections
reflect their greater macroscopic divergence. Zeki and
Shipp (1988) reviewed forward and backward connections
between areas V1, V2 and V5 in macaques, and concluded
that backward connections showed much greater conver-
gence and divergence than their forward counterparts
(Fig. 3a). This means that cells in higher visual areas
project back to a wider area than that which projects to
them, and cells in lower visual areas receive projections
from a wider area than they project to. Whereas forward
connections are typically patchy in nature, backward con-
nections are more diffuse and, even when patchy, their
terminals can be spread over a larger area than the
deployment of neurons projecting to them (Shipp and Zeki
1989a, b; Salin and Bullier 1995). These attributes mean
that visuotopy preserved in the forward direction is eroded
in the backward direction, allowing backward projections
Fig. 3 Topographic characteristics of forward and backward projec-
tions. a This schematic illustrates projections to and from a lower and
higher level in the visual hierarchy (adapted from Zeki and Shipp
1988). Red arrows signify forward connections and black arrows
backward connections. Note that there is a much greater convergence
(from the point of view of neurons receiving projections) and
divergence (from the point of view of neurons sending projections) in
backward relative to forward connections. b This schematic is
adapted from Rockland and Drash (1996), and illustrates the terminal
fields of ‘typical’ forward (axon FF red) and backward (axon FB
purple) connections in the visual system. IG represents infragranular
collaterals of a backward connection, and ad an apical dendrite;
cortical layers are labelled on the left. Note the few delimited arbours
of terminals on the forward connection, and the widely distributed
‘‘wand-like array’’ of backward connection terminals
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to contribute significantly to the extra classical receptive
field of a cell (Angelucci and Bullier 2003).
Salin and Bullier (1995) also noted that in the macaque
ventral occipitotemporal pathway (devoted to object rec-
ognition), backward connections outnumber forward con-
nections. Forward projections from the lateral geniculate
nucleus (LGN) to V1 are outnumbered 20 to 1 by those
returning in the opposite direction; and backward projec-
tions outweigh forward projections linking central V1 to
V4, TEO to TE, and TEO and TE to parahippocampal and
hippocampal areas. It is perhaps significant that backward
connections should be so prevalent in the object recogni-
tion pathway, given the clear evolutionary importance of
recognising objects and the fact that occluded objects are a
classic example of nonlinearity, whose recognition may
depend on top-down predictions (Mumford 1994).
Physiological characteristics
Forward and backward connections in sensory systems have
always been associated with ‘driving’ and ‘modulatory’
characteristics, respectively, though the latter physiological
duality has lacked the empirical clarity of its anatomical
counterpart, particularly for cortical interactions.
The simple but fundamental observation that visual
receptive field size increases at successive tiers of the
cortical hierarchy implies that a spatially restricted subset
of the total forward input to a neuron is capable of driving
it; evidently the same is not true, in general, of the back-
ward connections. Experiments manipulating feedback
(e.g. by cooling) found no effect upon spontaneous activity,
and were generally consistent with the formulation that
backward input might alter the way in which a neuron
would respond to its forward, driving input, but did not
influence activity in the absence of that driving input, nor
fundamentally alter the specificity of the response (Bullier
et al. 2001; Martinez-Conde et al. 1999; Przybyszewski
et al. 2000; Sandell and Schiller 1982). Thus driving and
modulatory effects could be defined in a somewhat circu-
lar, but logically coherent fashion.
The generic concept of driving versus modulatory also
applies to the primary thalamic relay nuclei, where driving
by forward connections implies an obligatory correlation of
pre and post-synaptic activity (e.g. as measured by a cross-
correlogram), that is barely detectable in backward con-
nections (Sherman and Guillery 1998). LGN neurons, for
instance, essentially inherit their receptive field character-
istics from a minority of retinal afferents, whilst displaying
a variety of subtler influences of cortical origin; these
derive from layer 6 of V1, and modulate the level and
synchrony of activity amongst LGN neurons. In vitro—in
slice preparations—driving connections produce large
excitatory postsynaptic potentials (EPSPs) to the first
action potential of a series that diminish in size with sub-
sequent action potentials (Li et al. 2003; Turner and Salt
1998). The effect is sufficiently discernible with just two
impulses, and termed ‘paired-pulse depression’. It is also
‘all or none’—the magnitude of electrical stimulation can
determine the probability of eliciting an EPSP, but not its
size. Modulating connections, by contrast, have smaller
initial EPSPs that grow larger with subsequent stimuli (i.e.
‘paired pulse facilitation’), and show a non-linear response
to variations in stimulus magnitude. Both types of EPSP
are blocked by antagonists of ionotropic glutamate
receptors.
Much as the study of laminar patterns of termination
imposed greater rigour on the concept of hierarchy, the
in vitro properties offer a robust, empirical definition of
driving and modulatory synaptic contacts (Reichova and
Sherman 2004). The latter also use metabotropic glutamate
receptors (mGluRs), which are not found in driving con-
nections. More recent work has extended the classification
from thalamic synapses to thalamocortical and cortico-
cortical connections between primary and secondary sen-
sory areas (Covic and Sherman 2011; De Pasquale and
Sherman 2011; Lee and Sherman 2008; Viaene et al.
2011a, b, c). A crucial question for this work is the extent
to which its in vitro findings are applicable in vivo, as
several of its initial results are at odds with previous gen-
eralisations: not least the finding that forward and back-
ward connections can have equal and symmetrical driving
and modulatory characteristics, albeit between cortical
areas that are close to each other in the cortical hierarchy.
With respect to this question, there are at least three sets of
considerations that deserve attention:
1. In vivo and in vitro physiologies are not identical
(Borst 2010). Importantly, the paired-pulse investiga-
tions routinely add GABA blocking agents to the
incubation medium, to avoid masking of glutamate
excitation. In vitro conditions are further characterised,
in general, by a higher concentration of calcium ions,
and lower levels of tonic network activity.
2. The paired pulse effects are largely presynaptic in
origin, and reflect the variability of transmitter release
probability rather than the operational characteristics
of the synapse in vivo (Beck et al. 2005; Branco and
Staras 2009; Dobrunz and Stevens 1997). Due to the
factors mentioned in (1), release probability is higher
in vitro (Borst 2010).
3. The physiology of forward/backward connections will
depend upon many factors—laminar distribution, the
cell-types contacted, location of synapses within the
dendritic arborisation, and the nature of postsynaptic
receptors—in addition to the presynaptic release
mechanisms.
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Each one of these factors might constrain the ability of
‘drivers’ to drive in vivo. For instance, even in an in vitro
system, tonic activity has been shown to switch cortico-
thalamic driver synapses to a ‘coincidence mode’, requir-
ing co-stimulation of two terminals to achieve postsynaptic
spiking (Groh et al. 2008). We will therefore assume a
distinction between driving and modulation in operational
terms; i.e. as might be found in vivo (e.g. neuroimaging
studies—see Bu¨chel and Friston 1997). In the realm of
whole-brain signal analysis, a related distinction can be
drawn between linear (driving) and nonlinear (modulatory)
frequency coupling (Chen et al. 2009).
We now consider the factors listed in (3) above and
evidence linking nonlinear (modulatory) effects to back-
ward connections, much of which depends on a closer
consideration of the roles played by the different types of
postsynaptic glutamate receptors:
Pharmacological characteristics
Glutamate is the principal excitatory neurotransmitter in
the cortex and activates both ionotropic and metabotropic
receptors. Metabotropic receptor binding triggers effects
with the longest time course, and is clearly modulatory in
action (Pin and Duvoisin 1995). Spiking transmission is
mediated by ionotropic glutamate receptors, classified
according to their AMPA, kainate and NMDA agonists
(Traynelis et al. 2010). These are typically co-localised,
and co-activated, but profoundly different biophysically.
AMPA activation is fast and stereotyped, with onset times
\1 ms, and deactivation within 3 ms; recombinant kainate
receptors have AMPA receptor-like kinetics, although they
can be slower in vivo. NMDA currents, by contrast, are
smaller but more prolonged: the onset and deactivation are
one and two orders of magnitude slower, respectively.
Unlike non-NMDA receptors, NMDA receptors are both
ligand-gated and voltage-dependent—to open their channel
they require both glutamate binding and membrane depo-
larisation to displace the blocking Mg2? ion. The voltage
dependence makes NMDA transmission non-linear and the
receptors function, in effect, as postsynaptic coincidence
detectors. These properties may be particularly important
in governing the temporal patterning of network activity
(Durstewitz 2009). Once activated, NMDA receptors play a
critical role in changing long-term synaptic plasticity (via
Ca2? influx) and increase the short-term gain of AMPA/
kainate receptors (Larkum et al. 2004). In summary,
NMDA receptors are nonlinear and modulatory in char-
acter, whereas non-NMDA receptors have more phasic,
driving properties.
NMDA receptors (NMDA-Rs) are ubiquitous in distri-
bution, and clearly participate in forward, intrinsic and
backward signal processing. They occur, for instance, at
both sensory and cortical synapses with thalamic relay cells
(Salt 2002). The ratio of NMDA-R:non-NMDA-R synaptic
current is not necessarily equivalent, however, and it is
known to be greater at the synapses of backward connec-
tions in at least one system, the rodent somatosensory relay
(Hsu et al. 2010). In the cortex, NMDA-R density can vary
across layers, in parallel with certain other modulatory
receptors (e.g. cholinergic, serotoninergic; Eickhoff et al.
2007). The key variable of interest may rather be the
subunit composition of NMDA-Rs (NR1 and NR2). The
NR2 subunit has four variants (NR2A–D), which possess
variable affinity for Mg2? and affect the speed of release
from Mg2? block, the channel conductance and its deac-
tivation time. Of these the NR2B subunit has the slowest
kinetics for release of Mg2?, making NMDA-R that con-
tain the NR2B subunit the most nonlinear, and the most
effective summators of EPSPs (Cull-Candy and Les-
zkiewicz 2004). In macaque sensory cortex, the NR2B
subunit is densest in layer 2, followed by layer 6 (Mun˜oz
et al. 1999)—the two cellular layers in which feedback
terminates most densely (equivalent data for other areas is
not available). Predictive coding requires descending non-
linear predictions to negate ascending prediction errors,
and interestingly, it seems that the inhibitory effects of
backward projections to macaque V1 are mediated by
NR2B-containing NMDA-R’s (Self et al. 2012). By con-
trast, layer 4 of area 3B, in particular, features a highly
discrete expression of the NR2C subunit (Mun˜oz et al.
1999), which has faster Mg2? kinetics (Clarke and Johnson
2006); in rodent S1 (barrel field) intrinsic connections
between stellate cells in layer 4 have also been demon-
strated to utilise NMDA-R currents that are minimally
susceptible to Mg2? block, and these cells again show high
expression of the NR2C subunit (Binshtok et al. 2006). In
general, therefore, the degree of nonlinearity conferred on
the NMDA-R by its subunit composition could be said to
correlate, in laminar fashion, with the relative exposure to
backward connections.
Studies with pharmacological manipulation of NMDA-
R in vivo are rare. However, application of an NMDA-R
agonist to cat V1 raised the gain of response to stimulus
contrast (Fox et al. 1990). The effect was observed in all
layers, except layer 4. Application of an NMDA-R antag-
onist had the reverse effect, reducing the gain such that the
contrast response curve (now mediated by non-NMDA-R)
became more linear. However, the gain-reduction effect
was only observed in layers 2 and 3. To interpret these
results, the NMDA-R agonist may have simulated a
recurrent enhancement of responses in the layers exposed
to backward connections (i.e. all layers save layer 4). The
experiments were conducted under anaesthesia, minimising
activity in backward pathways, and hence restricting the
potential to observe reduced gain when applying the
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NMDA-R antagonist. The restriction of the antagonist
effect to layer 2/3 could indicate that NMDA-R plays a
more significant role in nonlinear intrinsic processing in
these layers (e.g. in mediating direction selectivity, see
Rivadulla et al. 2001). The relative subunit composition of
NMDA-R in cat V1 is not known.
Finally, the modulatory properties of backward con-
nections have been demonstrated at the level of the single
neuron. The mechanism depends on the generation of
‘NMDA spikes’ within the thinner, more distal ramifica-
tions of basal and apical dendrites (Larkum et al. 2009;
Schiller et al. 2000), whose capacity to initiate axonal
spikes is potentiated through interaction with the back-
propagation of action potentials from the axon hillock
through to the dendritic tree. The effect was demonstrated
for apical dendrites in layer 1, and could simulate a
backward connection enhancing the gain of a neuron and
allowing coincidence detection to transcend cortical layers
(Larkum et al. 1999, 2004, 2009).
Note, also, that in highlighting the modulatory character
of backward connections we are not assuming a total lack
of the driving capability inferred from the in vitro studies
(Covic and Sherman 2011; De Pasquale and Sherman
2011). For instance, the NMDA mechanism for pyramidal
neurons described above might, potentially, be self-sus-
taining once initiated. Imaging studies of top-down influ-
ences acting on area V1 imply that backward connections
can sustain or even initiate activity, in the absence of a
retinal signal (e.g. Muckli et al. 2005; Harrison and Tong
2009). This is important from the point of view of pre-
dictive coding because, as noted above, top-down predic-
tions have to drive cells that explain away prediction error.
From a computational perspective, the key role of modu-
latory effects is to model the context-sensitive and non-
linear way in which causes interact to produce sensory
consequences. For example, backward projections enhance
the contrast between a receptive field’s excitatory centre
and inhibitory surround (Hupe´ et al. 1998).
A summary of the laminar, topographic and physiolog-
ical characteristics of forward and backward connections in
the visual system can be found in Table 1. These charac-
teristics are now be used as tests of directionality for
descending projections in the motor system.
Motor projections
In this section, we summarise the evidence that suggests
descending connections in the motor system are of a
backward type and are therefore in a position to mediate
predictions of proprioceptive input. See Fig. 9 for a sche-
matic of the implicit active inference scheme. As noted
above, these predictions rest upon context-sensitive and
implicitly nonlinear (modulatory) synaptic mechanisms
and are broadcast over divergent descending projections to
the motor plant.
Laminar characteristics
Prior to a detailed examination of motor cortex—BA 4 and
BA 6—two well-known features are worth noting. The first
is the regression of the ‘granular’ layer 4, that is commonly
described as absent in area 4—although Sloper et al. (1979)
clearly demonstrated a layer 4 in macaque area 4 as a diffuse
middle-layer stratum of large stellate cells—or present as an
‘incipient’ layer in parts of area 6; sometimes referred to as
dysgranular cortex (Watanabe-Sawaguchi et al. 1991). The
second feature is that the deep layers 5 and 6—the source of
massive motor projections to the spinal cord—are around
twice the thickness of the superficial layers 1–3 (Zilles et al.
1995). These projections originate in large pyramidal cells
(upper motor neurons, including Betz cells) in layer 5. These
differences in the architecture of motor cortex clearly sug-
gest an emphasis on the elaboration of backward rather than
forward connections—but the relative absence of layer 4
implies that the laminar rules developed for sensory cortex
cannot be applied without some modification.
Shipp (2005) performed a literature analysis of the
laminar characteristics of projections in the motor system,
motivated by the ‘‘paradoxical’’ placement of area 4 (pri-
mary motor cortex) below area 6 (premotor cortex) and the
supplementary motor area in the Felleman and Van Essen
(1991) hierarchy (Fig. 4a). Note that this placement is only
paradoxical from the point of view of conventional motor
control models; it is exactly what is predicted by active
inference. The schematic summary of this meta-analysis is
reproduced here, with some additions and updates (Fig. 5).
The scheme includes connections originating in primary
and higher order sensory cortex, primary motor cortex, sub-
divisions of premotor and supplementary motor areas and
areas of prefrontal cortex just rostral to motor cortex, arranged
in a hierarchy according to the characteristics of forward and
backward connections in Table 1. Following Felleman and
Van Essen (1991), forward connections to agranular cortex
are identified with terminal concentrations in layer 3, as
ascending terminations in sensory cortex typically terminate
in both this layer and layer 4 (see also Rozzi et al. 2006; Borra
et al. 2008). Conversely, backward-type terminations in
agranular cortex can be characterised by avoiding layer 3, and/
or being concentrated in layer 1 (see Fig. 6).
To what extent do corticocortical motor projections
conform to the forward/backward tests? We list the major
findings, followed by a more forensic analysis.
(a) The terminations of projections ascending the so-
matomotor hierarchy are intermediate in character
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(terminate in all layers) apart from those originating
in the sensory areas of parietal cortex, which have the
characteristics of forward projections.
(b) The terminations of projections descending the
somatomotor hierarchy have an overall backward
character. The pattern is notably more distinct for
terminations within postcentral granular areas, but the
available evidence leans toward a backward pattern in
the precentral agranular areas as well.
(c) The origins of projections ascending or descending
the somatomotor hierarchy are qualitatively similar to
each other; the projecting neurons are typically
described as bilaminar and equally dense in layers 3
and 5, or as predominating in layer 3.
Regarding (c), the proposition that both ascending and
descending connection originate primarily from layer 3
breaches the rules of forward and backward connectivity
developed for sensory cortex (Table 1). However, there is
considerable variability in the reported laminar density of
neurons that are labelled with retrograde tracers (attribut-
able to factors such as the type of tracer used, its laminar
spread at the site of deposition, survival time, and the
means of assessment). To circumvent such problems,
Fig. 5 emphasises quantitative data (the layer 3:5 ratio)
obtained for two or more projections in the same study,
thus enabling a more robust comparison of ascending and
descending connections assessed with identical methodol-
ogy. This ‘ratio of ratios’ approach suggests that the origin
of ascending projections within the somatomotor hierarchy
may be characterised by a higher superficial: deep ratio
than the origin of descending connections, even if both
ratios are above one. This is true for (1) projections to M1
from S1 versus premotor cortex (PMd), and (2) projections
to PMd from M1 versus rostral frontal cortex. The ratio of
ratios device may depart from the original test criteria but
as Felleman and Van Essen (1991) point out: ‘‘the key
issue is whether a consistent hierarchical scheme can be
identified using a modified set of criteria’’.
Fig. 4 Somatomotor hierarchy and anatomy. a The somatomotor
hierarchy of Felleman and Van Essen (1991), with several new areas
and pathways added by Burton and Sinclair (1996). Ri, Id and Ig are
in the insula, 35 and 36 are parahippocampal, and 12M is orbitome-
dial. The key point to note here is the high level of M1 (Brodmann’s
area 4 in green) in the hierarchy. b Prefrontal areas in the macaque,
taken from Petrides and Pandya (2009). The frontal motor areas have
been left white, and are illustrated in the figure below. c Somatomotor
areas in the macaque, adapted from Geyer et al. (2000). Areas F2, F4,
F5 and F7 constitute premotor cortex, and F3 and F6 the
supplementary motor area (SMA) together they form area 6. Primary
motor cortex (M1) is area 4, primary sensory cortex (S1) areas 1–3,
and areas 5 and 7b are secondary sensory areas. ps, as, cs, ips and ls
are principal, arcuate, central, intraparietal and lunate sulci,
respectively
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Notably, both the above examples involve a comparison
stretching across three hierarchical levels; when direct
reciprocal connections are examined between areas on
notionally adjacent levels; i.e. between M1 and PMd, PMv
or SMA, the patterns of retrograde labelling are reportedly
broadly similar (Dum and Strick 2005). This more recent
study holds that motor, premotor and supplementary motor
interconnections all show an ‘equal’ pattern of superficial:
deep cell labelling (i.e. % superficial within 33–67 %),
associated with a ‘lateral’ connection in hierarchical terms.
The discrepancy with the earlier cell-count data may reflect
methodological differences, but can also be given a more
systematic interpretation: that, similar to sensory cortex,
the laminar patterns associated with the motor hierarchy
obey the ‘distance rule’ (Barone et al. 2000), and are more
marked when assessing connections over a larger number
of levels.
If the laminar origins of directly reciprocal projections
are similar, a different style of analysis might be needed to
reveal differences. An example is a study by Johnson and
Ferraina (1996), who noted that cells in SMA projecting to
PMd were more concentrated in the superficial layers than
cells projecting from SMA to M1: they used a statistical
comparison of the mean and shape of the two depth dis-
tributions to confirm that the difference was significant. In
summary, the available evidence suggests ascending con-
nections in the motor system have a forward character and
descending connections are backward in nature. There is no
evidence for the reverse. The bilaminar origins of motor
connections indicate that motor, premotor and supple-
mentary motor cortices are close together in the somato-
motor hierarchy.
In sensory cortex, it is generally accepted that bilaminar
origins can be consistent with forward, lateral, or backward
projections, and that patterns of termination are typically
more indicative of hierarchical order (Felleman and Van
Essen 1991). The motor system may be similar, but as
relatively few adequate descriptions of laminar terminal
patterns are available, the indications derive from an
uncomfortably small number of reports. Ascending pro-
jections are typically described as being columnar—a
multilayer distribution that would be consistent with a
lateral connection. Perhaps the best documented example is
the projection from M1 to SMA, illustrated by photomi-
crographs in three separate studies (Ku¨nzle 1978b; Leich-
netz; Stepniewska et al. 1993). Ku¨nzle (1978b) noted: ‘‘the
anterograde labelling within the columns appeared some-
what heavier in supragranular layers 1–3 than in infra-
granular layers 5–6’’, whilst Stepniewska et al. (1993) put
it thus: ‘‘anterogradely labelled axons and terminals are
concentrated mainly in layers 1 and 3–6, leaving layer 2
almost free of label’’. The material obtained by each study
is clearly comparable, and does not readily demonstrate
forward characteristics. The projections to agranular cortex
that do display a forward pattern; i.e. terminating mainly in
the mid-layers, are those arising in sensory cortex, e.g.
from areas 2 and 5 to M1, or from several visuosensory
parietal areas to premotor cortex (see Fig. 5 for references).
Backward laminar patterns for motor and premotor
projections are most evident in parietal cortex, typified by
the following description: ‘‘an unlabeled line highlighted
lamina 4 amid substantial anterograde labelling in the
supra- and infragranular layers above and below it’’
(Leichnetz 1986). For motor cortex itself, there is just one
equivalent description, pertaining to a back projection from
area F4 to M1, where ‘‘the labelled terminals were dis-
tributed throughout all layers, with the exception of the
lower half of layer 300 (Watanabe-Sawaguchi et al. 1991);
this connection is reproduced here in Fig. 6. The backward
pattern is alternatively diagnosed by a superficial concen-
tration of terminals, especially within layer 1—e.g. ‘‘in
certain regions, such as area 4… label was found pre-
dominantly in supragranular layers and especially in layer
1’’ (Barbas and Pandya 1987). Ku¨nzle (1978a), also
describing premotor cortex projections, makes a similar
comment: ‘‘the cortical projections are found to terminate
consistently and often with highest intensity within cortical
layer 100. This description was a global one, including
occipital and parietal cortex where the layer 1 concentra-
tion may have been most prominent. However, his sketches
of terminations within motor cortex show several connec-
tions that appear to satisfy this description, again as listed
in Fig. 5. It is possible that motor terminal patterns also
observe the ‘distance rule’ and are more liable to display
hierarchical character when they traverse more than one
level; this could apply to the cases illustrated by Barbas and
Pandya (1987), for instance.
The literature survey lacks detailed studies of reciprocal
terminal connections, examined area by area with identical
methods. If, as we infer, a lateral (multilaminar) pattern of
terminals in the ascending direction is reciprocated by a
backward pattern in the descending direction, this infringes
on the standard hierarchical dogma (which would hold that
a pair of reciprocal connections should both be ‘lateral’, or
that one should be forward and the other backward (Fell-
eman and Van Essen 1991). The anomaly might be recti-
fied by an appropriate, purposeful study of reciprocal
terminal connections in motor cortex. Alternatively, the
standard dogma might simply fail to address the full
diversity of cortical connectivity; other factors, such as
differential architecture, may also be determinants of
laminar patterns (Barbas 1986; Hilgetag and Grant 2010).
Ultimately, the study of laminar patterns is a proxy for a
more sophisticated, physiological determination of the
functional composition of a projection; e.g. as character-
ised by driving or modulatory synaptic contacts (Covic and
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Sherman 2011) on particular subclasses of excitatory or
inhibitory neurons (Medalla and Barbas 2009).
In the absence of such evidence, the interim conclusion
is that laminar connectivity patterns reveal a relatively
clear-cut hierarchical divide within the somatomotor sys-
tem between (higher) precentral agranular motor and
(lower) postcentral granular sensory areas, and that hier-
archical divisions within the agranular areas are more
subtle. Even so, the indications from both origins and ter-
minations place rostral premotor (or even prefrontal) cor-
tices at the apex of the somatomotor hierarchy, favouring
the active inference model over a serial motor command
model.
Topographic characteristics
In the sensory system, backward connections widely
bifurcate and have very distributed terminations, and are
both more divergent and more convergent than their for-
ward counterparts (see Fig. 3). Do descending connections
in the motor system share these properties?
First consider the connections of motor neurons in the
periphery. A single motor neuron innervates hundreds of
muscle fibres, and these fibres do not form discrete clusters
but are distributed uniformly across part of a muscle (a
motor unit). There is therefore extensive overlap of the
motor units innervated by different motor neurons
(Schieber 2007). Further divergence on the microscopic
level is shown by corticospinal axons: one studied by
Shinoda et al. (1981) innervated motor neurons in the
nuclei of the radial, ulnar and median nerves (Fig. 7a), and
neurophysiological evidence for this anatomical diver-
gence was found by Lemon and Porter (1976).
The distribution of corticospinal neurons innervating
(via spinal motor neurons) a single muscle can be exam-
ined by use of the rabies virus tracer; this subset of corti-
cospinal neurons which synapse directly with spinal motor
neurons, as opposed to interneurons, are known as ‘CM’
neurons (described at length in the ‘‘Discussion’’). Com-
parison of cases examining digit, elbow and shoulder
muscles reveals the expected gross proximal–distal
topography in M1, but also shows intermingling of corti-
cospinal neurons with different targets (Rathelot and Strick
2009). Thus corticospinal axons from a large territory of
M1 also converge on a single body part (also see Geyer
et al. 2000).
A complementary set of cortical ‘muscle maps’ has been
obtained by recording electromyographic (EMG) activity
within the forelimb musculature, produced across a grid of
cortical stimulation sites (Fig. 8b from Boudrias et al.
2010). EMG activity reflects both direct and indirect cor-
ticospinal circuitry, and the resulting muscle maps show no
sign of segregated regions representing different muscles or
muscle groups. Individual stimulation sites commonly
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yield EMG activity in both proximal and distal muscles,
such that the somatotopic organisation of forelimb M1 was
only recognisable in the medial and lateral poles of the
mapped area with, respectively, proximal and distal seg-
regated muscle representations. In PMd and PMv there was
no discernible topography at all, with proximal and distal
muscle maps overlapping completely.
The divergence of M1s neuronal outputs may be con-
trasted with older data pertaining to their sensory afferent
inputs. Neurons responding to joint movement (but not to
cutaneous stimulation) are thought to represent sensory
input from muscle spindles, and many neurons in M1 are
selective for a single joint. For example, Lemon and Porter
(1976) found that 110/152 (72 %) of M1 neurons respon-
sive to passive forelimb manipulation in alert macaques
were only activated by manipulation of one particular joint
(e.g. a single finger joint). The ascending sensory repre-
sentation of individual muscles in M1 is thus distinctly
more focal in nature than the descending (divergent) motor
output, as assessed at the level of M1 neurons. At the
macroscopic level, Wong et al. (1978) mapped the cortical
distribution of these sensory inputs to M1 (Fig. 8a), and
found that whilst sensory inputs seem less organised here
than in sensory areas (e.g. different sensory modalities
innervating the same M1 microcolumns, unlike in S1),
there is ‘‘virtually no overlap of the… sensory fields related
to nonadjacent joints’’: in contrast to the M1 motor fields
mapped by Boudrias et al. (2010).
Now let us examine corticocortical connections within
the sensorimotor system. Studies using dual retrograde
tracers have examined the sources of input to the parts of
M1 innervating the distal and proximal parts of the monkey
forelimb (Tokuno and Tanji 1993) and hindlimb (Hatanaka
et al. 2001). They noted that clear, separate subregions in
SI, SII and area 5 project to the distal and proximal rep-
resentations of either limb in M1, whereas the projections
from motor areas [cingulate, supplementary and dorsal area
6 (PMd)] were intermixed: several regions in these areas
sent axons to both distal and proximal forelimb parts of M1
(Fig. 7b) and a similar pattern was observed for the hind-
limb. Essentially, this demonstrates that divergence in the
descending (motor) input to M1 exceeds divergence in the
ascending (sensory) input to M1.
In a later study, Dancause et al. (2006) used a bidirec-
tional tracer placed in PMv to prepare high-resolution
somatotopic maps of the reciprocal corticocortical
Fig. 5 Laminar systematics in the somatomotor hierarchy: this figure is updated from Shipp (2005). The diagrams show patterns of terminations
(left) and cells of origin (right) in selected areas comprising the somatomotor hierarchy (shown anatomically in Fig. 4b, c). Not all connections
are shown, only those for which an adequate indication of laminar characteristics is obtainable (the blue numbers provide a key to the literature).
In order to compile data across studies with variable terminology and placement of injected tracers, or with similar outcomes, some areas are
combined into single blocks; the ampersand should be interpreted as ‘and/or’. The diagrams are intended to give an indication of forward or
backward relationships, but not the precise number of pathways or levels involved. The sensory tiers, for instance, are compressed into a single
level: S1 shown as a single block, comprises four separate areas (3a, 3b, 1 and 2) that precede higher order parietal areas in a sensory hierarchy.
Left panel schematic illustrations of terminal patterns—forward (2, 3, 13 and 20); intermediate (4, 5, 6, 11 and 21); and backward (1, 7–10, 12
and 14–19). Forward patterns have a concentration in layer 3. Intermediate patterns are described as columnar, with little or no laminar
differentiation. Backward patterns are concentrated in layers 1 (and 6) and/or tend to avoid the lower part of layer 3. Feedback from M1 to S1
tends to avoid layer 4. Right panel laminar distribution of cells of origin, coded as the relative density of labelled cells in layers 3 and 5. In
general, ascending connections are associated with a high 3:5 ratio, and descending connections with a lower 3:5 ratio (that may still exceed
unity). Factors influencing cell density can vary considerably across studies and few provide quantitative cell count data. Coloured boxes
emphasise four studies that provide comparative cell data for connections at two or more separate levels. Pink the ascending input to M1 from S1
has a greater 3:5 ratio than the descending input to M1 from premotor cortex (data from Ghosh et al. 1987). Green the ascending and descending
inputs to premotor cortex show a similar relationship (Barbas and Pandya 1987). Brown a study in which the interconnections of M1 with
premotor and supplementary motor cortex were not found to be distinct (Dum and Strick 2005). Blue the depth profile of connections from F3
(area SMA) to M1 and to premotor cortex were shown to differ, neurons projecting to M1 being less superficial (Johnson and Ferraina 1996).
There are no quantitative data where the density of layer 5 cells much exceeds layer 3 cells in motor connections, and only rare qualitative
descriptions to this effect, e.g. for the projection from F4 to M1 (Stepniewska et al. 1993); and from M1 to area 1 (Burton and Fabri 1995).
1 Ku¨nzle (1978a); 2 Jones et al. (1978), Shipp et al. (1998), Leichnetz (2001); 3 Jones et al. (1978), Ku¨nzle (1978b), Pons and Kaas (1986);
4 Ku¨nzle (1978b), Leichnetz (1986), Matelli et al. (1986), Stepniewska et al. (1993); 5 Barbas and Pandya (1987); 6 Ku¨nzle (1978a), Barbas and
Pandya (1987); 7 Watanabe-Sawaguchi et al. (1991); 8 Ku¨nzle (1978a), Barbas and Pandya (1987), 9 Barbas and Pandya (1987), Watanabe-
Sawaguchi et al. (1991); 10 Jones et al. (1978), Ku¨nzle (1978b), Leichnetz (1986), Stepniewska et al. (1993); 11 Ku¨nzle (1978a), Barbas and
Pandya (1987), Watanabe-Sawaguchi et al. (1991); 12 Arikuni et al. (1988); 13 Jones et al. (1978), Pons and Kaas (1986); 14 Preuss and
Goldman-Rakic (1989), Watanabe-Sawaguchi et al. (1991); 15 Ku¨nzle (1978a), Barbas and Pandya (1987), Deacon (1992); 16 Ku¨nzle (1978b),
Watanabe-Sawaguchi et al. (1991); 17 Ku¨nzle (1978b), Leichnetz (1986); 18 Barbas and Pandya (1987); 19 Ku¨nzle (1978a), Matelli et al. (1986),
Barbas and Pandya (1987), Deacon (1992), Gerbella et al. (2011); 20 Rozzi et al. (2006), Borra et al. (2008); 21 Barbas and Pandya (1987),
Deacon (1992), Gerbella et al. (2011); 22 Jones et al. (1978), Leichnetz (1986), Ghosh et al. (1987), Huerta and Pons (1990), Darian-Smith et al.
(1993), Stepniewska et al. (1993); 23 Matelli et al. (1986), Barbas and Pandya (1987), Kurata (1991), Watanabe-Sawaguchi et al. (1991);
24 Barbas and Pandya (1987), Deacon (1992); 25 Arikuni et al. (1988), Watanabe-Sawaguchi et al. (1991), Lu et al. (1994); 26 Barbas and
Pandya (1987), Watanabe-Sawaguchi et al. (1991), Deacon (1992), Gerbella et al. (2011); 27 Kurata (1991); 28 Muakkassa and Strick (1979),
Godschalk et al. (1984), Leichnetz (1986), Ghosh et al. (1987), Stepniewska et al. (1993), Lu et al. (1994); 29 Pons and Kaas (1986), Darian-
Smith et al. (1993), Burton and Fabri (1995); 30 Dum and Strick (2005); 31 Muakkassa and Strick (1979), Godschalk et al. (1984), Leichnetz
(1986), Ghosh et al. (1987), Stepniewska et al. (1993), Lu et al. (1994), Johnson and Ferraina (1996); 32 Matelli et al. (1986), Kurata (1991),
Johnson and Ferraina (1996)
b
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connections between PMv and M1. Two results are of
interest: (a) that the distal forelimb part of PMv connects
with both distal and proximal forelimb parts of M1, dem-
onstrating descending divergence similar to the other motor
areas noted above; (b) that the termination of the
descending projection to M1, while patchy, was broader
than the territory occupied by source neurons for the
ascending projection, thus replicating the kind of pattern
noted previously in visual cortex. Our final test of forward
and backward connection types is that if they are of
unequal size, backward projections should outnumber for-
ward. In fact, descending projections outnumber ascending
ones between area 6 and area 4 (Matelli et al. 1986), areas
F6 and F3 (Luppino et al. 1993), and between CMAr and
SMA/PMdr (Hatanaka et al. 2003).
Physiological and pharmacological characteristics
Zilles et al. (1995) demonstrated that human motor cortex
has the same distribution of NMDA and non-NMDA
receptors as is found elsewhere in the brain: the former are
concentrated in supragranular layers, whereas the latter
have a uniform (AMPA-R) or infragranular (KA-R) dis-
tribution. When a granular layer is present, e.g. in rat
prefrontal cortex, NMDA receptors tend to avoid it (Rudolf
et al. 1996). Hence, one might expect that as in sensory
cortex, descending corticocortical motor connections (ter-
minating in supragranular layers) have access to modula-
tory synaptic mechanisms.
Ghosh et al. (1987) counted the relative numbers of
neurons projecting to monkey forelimb M1. In the 3 ani-
mals they examined, 11–31 % of neurons projecting to M1
came from premotor cortex (lateral area 6), whereas
1–17 % of neurons originated in area 5 (higher sensory
cortex). Ghosh and Porter (1988) then stimulated these two
cortical areas using surface electrodes, and recorded EPSPs
and IPSPs in M1. They found that despite the bias in
numbers towards descending projections, stimulation of
area 5 neurons elicited responses in 90 % of recorded M1
neurons, whereas the same stimulation of premotor cortex
Fig. 6 Backward termination pattern of a premotor to M1 projection:
Adapted from Watanabe-Sawaguchi et al. (1991), this is a darkfield
photomicrograph showing labelled cells and terminals in area 4 after
injection of WGA-HRP into the inferior premotor area (PMv, or F5)
of a baboon. The termination pattern is characteristic of a backward
connection as it is bilaminar (with a particularly dense supragranular
projection) and minimally dense in lower layer 3. W.m. signifies white
matter
Fig. 7 Topographic characteristics of projections in the motor
system: a adapted from Shinoda et al. (1981), this is a transverse
section through the spinal cord at level C7, showing a corticospinal
axon that projects to at least four different motor nuclei: those of the
ulnar (the upper nucleus), radial (the lower two nuclei) and medial
nerves (not shown). b Adapted from Tokuno and Tanji (1993), this
depicts cortical areas containing neurons projecting to proximal
(white) and distal (black) movement areas of M1. Lower hierarchical
areas have segregated projections, whereas higher projections are
intermixed (grey) with the exception of premotor cortex, whose inputs
were subsequently also shown to be intermixed (Dancause et al.
2006). CMAc caudal cingulate motor area, CMAr rostral cingulate
motor area, MI primary motor cortex, PMd dorsal premotor cortex,
PMv ventral premotor cortex, SI primary somatosensory cortex, SII
secondary somatosensory cortex, SMA supplementary motor area
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caused only 30 % of recorded M1 neurons to respond. One
can infer from this that ascending projections from sensory
cortex are the more driving in character, despite their lesser
number. Likewise, it is known that inactivation of M1 has a
more significant effect on the activity in PMv and SMA
than vice versa (Schmidlin et al. 2008), which one would
expect if descending connections to M1 were more
modulatory, and ascending connections from M1 more
driving in character.
Shima and Tanji (1998) provide valuable evidence about
the receptor types mediating descending connections to M1
from SMA, in comparison to ascending connections to M1
from S1. They showed that 83 % of the M1 neurons acti-
vated by stimulation of S1 were suppressed by a non-
Fig. 8 Somatotopic differences in ascending and descending motor
projections: this figure illustrates the relative preservation of soma-
totopy in forward projections and the much greater convergence and
divergence in backward projections in the motor system, as is found
in sensory projections (schematised in Fig. 3a). a This figure is taken
from Wong et al. (1978). It illustrates the spatial distribution of
neurons in macaque M1 that respond to passive movement of the
relevant joint (the tiny letters indicate the direction of movement, not
important for our purposes). One can see that the shoulder, elbow,
wrist and fingers joints’ representations are overlapping but reason-
ably somatotopic: non-adjacent joints do not overlap. The 15 % of
neurons that responded to movement of multiple joints are not
illustrated here. b This figure is taken from Boudrias et al. (2010). It
illustrates the motor output maps for the premotor cortex and M1 (top
right and bottom left of each drawing, respectively) of two macaques,
with each row corresponding to muscles around different joints. The
maps were obtained by stimulating in the dotted cortical sites and
recording EMGs in peripheral muscles; the red and yellow dots
signify post-stimulus facilitation and suppression, respectively.
Whilst some resemblance can be seen to the sensory maps in a, it
is clear that there is far more convergence and divergence of these
descending projections
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NMDA-R antagonist, whereas only 10 % were affected by
an NMDA-R antagonist. Conversely, of neurons in M1
activated by stimulation of SMA, roughly equal propor-
tions (55 %) were affected by NMDA-R and non-NMDA-
R antagonists. This indicates that the influence of SMA
over M1 depends to a much greater extent upon NMDA-R
transmission, that can be nonlinear and modulatory, whilst
the ascending connections from S1 to M1 rely more
heavily on AMPA or kainate receptors, with linear prop-
erties more characteristic of driving connections.
Shima and Tanji (1998) speculated that SMA—via
NMDA-Rs—might modulate the gain of driving S1 inputs
to M1. Evidence for higher motor areas modulating the
gain of M1 neurons has actually been provided by Shimazu
et al. (2004), who recorded corticospinal outputs following
stimulation of the ventral premotor area (F5) and/or M1.
M1 stimulation alone evoked several corticospinal volleys,
whereas F5 stimulation alone evoked minimal output. If F5
stimulation directly preceded that of M1, however, the later
corticospinal volleys were powerfully facilitated, as were
the resulting EPSEs in 92 % of intrinsic hand motor neu-
rons. A similar outcome was observed when the experi-
ment was repeated in an alert monkey performing a motor
task, allowing the additional observation that the effect of
F5 stimulation varied with the type of grasp being per-
formed (Prabhu et al. 2009).
Finally, in relation to descending corticospinal projec-
tions, note that cortical modulatory connections have
smaller EPSPs which show facilitation with stimulus rep-
etition and are more non-linear: the direct synapses of
corticospinal neurons with motor neurons also have these
properties. Their unitary (single fibre) EPSPs are of the
order of 25–120 lV (Asanuma et al. 1979; Porter 1985):
much less than corticocortical unitary EPSPs which are
more often[1 mV (Avermann et al. 2012; Andersen et al.
1990; Sa´ez and Friedlander 2009; Zilberter et al. 2009).
Furthermore, on repeated corticospinal stimulation, the
motor neuron unitary EPSPs show facilitation (Jankowska
et al. 1975; Shapovalov 1975).
It is also established that the targets of corticospinal pro-
jections express NMDA receptors: for instance, spinal inter-
neurons and Renshaw cells (McCulloch et al. 1974; Lamotte
d’Incamps and Ascher 2008) and also motor neurons (To¨lle
et al. 1993), which have been shown to contain the more non-
linear NR2B subunit (Mutel et al. 1998; Palecek et al. 1999).
This provides a synaptic mechanism for the contextual (non-
linear gain control) nature of descending predictions from
corticospinal motor neurons. Note that neither conventional
motor control models nor optimal control schemes would
predict that corticospinal projections should have modulatory
properties (as a motor command must be driving, not modu-
latory). Active inference, by contrast, allows a mixture of
modulatory and driving capabilities in its descending
projections, which (as noted in the previous section) can both
be compatible with backward connections.
A summary of our analysis can be found in Table 1. It is
clear that with some minor adjustment of the criteria for
forward and backward connections, ascending and
descending connections in the motor hierarchy should be
classified as forward and backward types, respectively.
This supports our contention that somatomotor system may
implement active inference, in which backward connec-
tions provide predictions and forward connections convey
prediction errors.
Discussion
We started by motivating the importance of classifying
motor efferents as forward or backward by appealing to the
competing theoretical predictions of active inference and
conventional motor control. The weight of empirical evi-
dence suggests that descending connections in the so-
matomotor system are of the backward type, as would be
required by active inference. In this section, we review the
anatomical implications of active inference for the func-
tional anatomy of the motor system, including the unique
cytoarchitectonic feature of motor cortex (Brodmann’s area
4 and area 6): its curious regression of a granular layer 4.
Active inference and sensory reafference
From the point of view of active inference, motor cortex
occupies a relatively high level in a predictive coding
hierarchy (see Fig. 4a), providing predictions of sensory
input to several subordinate structures, ranging from spinal
circuits to sensory cortex. The graphical representation of
this view, shown in Fig. 9, highlights the distinction
between somatomotor prediction errors which result in
movement, and somatosensory prediction errors that
inform percepts. In the somatomotor system (left panel),
descending corticospinal projections encode predictions of
proprioceptive input; i.e. muscular (muscle spindle), ten-
don (Golgi tendon organ) and articular states. Together,
these signals predict the sensory consequences of a
movement trajectory; i.e. changes in proprioception or
kinaesthesia during the course of the movement and the
proprioceptive state at its conclusion. Comparison of these
predictive signals with the proprioceptive states encoded
by sensory receptors generates proprioceptive prediction
errors that—uniquely in the nervous system—can be
resolved by action, via activation of alpha motor neurons in
the spinal reflex arc. The consequences of these actions,
both proprioceptive and somatosensory, are then trans-
mitted back to sensorimotor cortex as various forms of
sensory reafference.
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The descending projections from motor cortex to the
somatosensory system (not shown) encode predictions of a
broader set of afferent inputs: proprioception plus cutaneous
sensations (pressure receptor and light touch receptor states).
Because it generates predictions in both proprioceptive and
exteroceptive modalities, motor cortex can thus be regarded
as a multimodal sensorimotor area rather than a purely motor
area (Hatsopoulos and Suminski 2011).
Sensory reafference can become sensory prediction
error at various levels in the nervous system (right panel,
Fig. 9 Somatomotor and somatosensory connections in active infer-
ence: In this figure, we have focused on monosynaptic reflex arcs and
have therefore treated alpha motor neurons as prediction error units.
In this scheme, descending (corticospinal) proprioceptive predictions
(from upper motor neurons in M1) and (primary sensory) proprio-
ceptive afferents from muscle spindles converge on alpha motor
neurones on the ventral horn of the spinal cord. The comparison of
these signals generates a prediction error. The gain of this prediction
error is in part dependent upon descending predictions of its precision
(for further explanation see ‘CM neurons and predictions of precision’
in the ‘‘Discussion’’). The associated alpha motor neuron discharges
elicit (extrafusal) muscle fibre contractions until prediction error is
suppressed. Ascending proprioceptive and somatosensory information
does not become a prediction error until it encounters descending
predictions, whether in the (ventral posterior nucleus of the) thalamus,
the dorsal column nuclei, or much earlier in the dorsal horn. In the
cortex, error units at a given level receive predictions from that level
and the level above, and project to prediction units at that level and
the level above (only two levels are shown). In this way, discrep-
ancies between actual and predicted inputs—resulting in prediction
errors—can either be resolved at that level or passed further up the
hierarchy (Friston et al. 2006). Prediction units project to error units at
their level and the level below, attempting to explain away their
activity. Crucially, active inference suggests that both proprioceptive
(motor) and somatosensory systems use a similar architecture. It is
generally thought that prediction units correspond to principal cells in
infragranular layers (deep pyramidal cells) that are the origin of
backward connections; while prediction error units are principal cells
in supragranular layers (superficial pyramidal cells) that elaborate
forward projections (Mumford 1992; Friston and Kiebel 2009). Note
that we have implicitly duplicated proprioceptive prediction errors at
the spinal (somatomotor) and thalamic (somatosensory) levels. This is
because the gain of central (somatosensory) principal units encoding
prediction error is set by neuromodulation (e.g. synchronous gain or
dopamine), while the gain of peripheral (somatomotor) prediction
error units is set by NMDA-Rs and gamma motor neuron activity. In
predictive coding, this gain encodes the precision (inverse variance)
of prediction errors (see Feldman and Friston 2010). Algorithmically,
the duplication of prediction errors reflects the fact that somatomotor
prediction errors drive action, while somatosensory prediction errors
drive (Bayes-optimal) predictions. For reasons of clarity we have
omitted connections ascending the cord in the somatomotor system,
e.g. spinal projections to M1 and the transcortical reflex pathway from
S1 (in particular the proprioceptive area 3a) to M1: these are
described in the ‘‘Discussion’’
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Fig. 9). The majority of afferents interact at an early stage
with corticospinal input to the dorsal horn (Lemon and
Griffiths 2005), where prediction errors can be generated
by the presynaptic inhibition of primary afferents (Wall
and Lidierth 1997). Lemon and Griffiths (2005) suggest, in
fact, that this predictive modulation of sensory input is the
evolutionary precursor to direct corticospinal control of
motor neurons (see below). The remaining primary affer-
ents in the dorsal columns (15 % of the fibres) may then
encounter descending predictions at the level of the dorsal
column nuclei (via branches of corticospinal axons (Che-
ema et al. 1985; Bentivoglio and Rustioni 1986), and
subsequently at the thalamus. Note that the corticospinal
tract is one likely source of the attenuation of spinal sen-
sory reafference during movement (also seen in sensori-
motor cortices); uniquely, the sensory reafference to M1 is
also inhibited during motor planning (Seki and Fetz 2012).
Proprioceptive reafference to precentral motor cortex
(not shown) is conveyed via the spinothalamic tract, which
projects to the motor thalamus (the ventral lateral posterior
thalamic nucleus, VLp)3 and then to primary motor cortex
(Stepniewska et al. 2003). Retrograde tracing techniques
show that the origin of spinothalamic inputs to VLp are
separate clusters of interneurons sited in layers V and VII
of the spinal grey matter (Craig 2008). Both groups are
thought to integrate primary afferent sensory signals with
descending motor signals—layers V and VII processing
cutaneous and proprioceptive signals, respectively—which
Craig succinctly summarises as an ascending projection
‘‘conveying activity that represents the state of the
segmental interneuronal pools that are used for motor
control’’. Another pathway likely to carry ascending pro-
prioceptive prediction errors is the set of dorsal spinocer-
ebellar tract neurons that constitute the thoracolumbar
nucleus known as ‘Clarke’s column’. This nucleus, known
to receive proprioceptive input from the hind limb, has
recently been shown (in the mouse) to interact with signals
carried by descending corticospinal axons (Hantman and
Jessell 2010); the interaction has both excitatory and
inhibitory components (mediated by local interneurons),
which could potentially generate a proprioceptive predic-
tion error. Once again, these signals reach motor cortex via
VLp (not shown in Fig. 9).
Figure 9 is intended to highlight the distinction between
somatomotor prediction errors that result in movement, and
somatosensory prediction errors that inform percepts. Of
course, the distinction between the somatomotor and
somatosensory systems themselves is not so easily made:
as we mention above, motor cortex might best be regarded
as a multimodal sensorimotor area. One could view some
sensory cortices in the same light: for example, the border
(proprioceptive) area 3a likely receives descending pro-
prioceptive predictions from M1 (Witham et al. 2010)—
rather than efference copy—and ascending proprioceptive
information from the motor nuclei of the thalamus (Huff-
man and Krubitzer 2001). At the same time it is embedded
within the somatosensory system, receiving somatosensory
thalamic input. Somatomotor (proprioceptive) prediction
errors in this area could either be resolved by movement
via projections to gamma motor neurons (see next section),
or they could inform proprioception via projections to
secondary sensory cortices. Likewise, it is notable that S1
cortex drives whisker retraction in the mouse (Matyas et al.
2010).
Corticomotor (CM) neurons and predictions
of precision (gain)
As noted above, the beauty of the spinal reflex arc is that
proprioceptive prediction errors can be resolved simply,
quickly and automatically by agonist and antagonist mus-
cles. But there is an additional longer-latency, transcortical
component to many reflexes (particularly hand and finger
reflexes) that is known to exhibit a higher degree of
intermuscular coordination, thereby being ‘more intelligent
than reflexive’ according to some authors (Matthews 1991;
Kurtzer et al. 2008; Shemmell et al. 2010; Pruszynski et al.
2011). Neurons in motor thalamus (VLp) and motor cortex
are known to be capable of short latency sensory responses
to limb movement (Herter et al. 2009; Hummelsheim et al.
1988; Lemon and Porter 1976; Vitek et al. 1994) although
the particular anatomical pathway providing short latency
input has been difficult to establish, as there is no ana-
tomical confirmation of lemniscal input to VLp.4 None-
theless, however mediated, this rapid cortical sensory
response can be interpreted analogously to the spinal reflex,
as a proprioceptive prediction eliciting a motor response,
and movement, such as to quash an error signal. How so?
One component of long-latency reflexes is mediated by
the specific subpopulation of corticospinal neurons (known
as ‘CM’ neurons) that make direct contact with spinal
motor neurons, and whose sensory activity (i.e. response to
an unexpected torque perturbation of a wrist muscle)
formed an appropriate match to the timing of the late (M2)
3 Thalamic terminology follows the scheme of Macchi and Jones
(1997).
4 An earlier body of work employing peripheral nerve stimulation
provided substantial indirect evidence that sensory input could be
conveyed to M1 via dorsal column (lemniscal) input to thalamic VLp
nucleus; especially a subnucleus known as VPLo (Asanuma et al.
1980; Horne and Tracey 1979; Lemon and van der Burg 1979). But,
conversely, several anatomical studies specifically failed to offer any
evidence for such lemniscal input to VPLo (Asanuma et al. 1980,
1983; Hirai and Jones 1988; Kalil 1981; Tracey et al. 1980). The
conflict in these observations has yet to be satisfactorily resolved.
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component of the wrist stretch reflex (Cheney and Fetz
1984). The distribution of CM neurons is now known to be
quite limited in its extent, occupying the caudal part of M1
and extending into the adjacent component of S1, area 3a
(Rathelot and Strick 2006, 2009). CM neurons have their
greatest influence upon muscles of the distal forelimb, in
both man (de Noordhout et al. 1999; Palmer and Ashby
1992) and rhesus monkeys (McKiernan et al. 1998), and
are considered the anatomical substrate for the evolution of
manual dexterity in higher primates (Lemon 2008).
CM neurons include both ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ units (as
gauged by soma size) and the former, located in M1, likely
convey proprioceptive predictions directly to alpha motor
neurons. In the case of these direct (AMPA-R mediated)
contacts with motor neurons, prediction errors could only
be generated by post-synaptic inhibition of those motor
neurons by sensory afferent interneurons: see for example
the left panel of Fig. 2. These descending fast CM neurons
could not themselves carry prediction errors, because they
(probably) also synapse with spinal interneurons, implying
integration with local sensory input (Kasser and Cheney,
1985): these are descending prediction-type properties, and
the same signal cannot be both prediction and error. We
propose that the majority of CM neurons, however, medi-
ate a different kind of prediction: not of sensory input
itself, but its precision.
In predictive coding, there are two kinds of descending
predictions (shown in Fig. 9). First order predictions are of
sensory input, and therefore drive (or inhibit) prediction
error units in the level below, as we described in the first
section. Second order predictions are of the precision
(inverse variance) of sensory input, and they optimise the
post-synaptic gain of the prediction error units below. This
is classically a slower process than the first order one,
which uses neuromodulators (e.g. NMDA-R’s, acetylcho-
line or dopamine) rather than fast-on/fast-off transmission
(Feldman and Friston 2010). These processes are exactly
analogous to the statistical method of weighting the (first
order) mean of an experimental observation according to
its (second order) standard error: an experimental ‘predic-
tion error’ of high precision will compel a change in the
null ‘prediction’. In the cortex, the top-down process of
optimising the precision (gain) of prediction error units is
called ‘attention’ (Feldman and Friston 2010). Attention
should not only optimally increase the gain of sensory
signals during perception, but also of proprioceptive sig-
nals during movement (Brown et al. 2011).
Two ways in which the precision (gain) of propriocep-
tive prediction errors can be enhanced are: (1) by
increasing the gain of alpha motor neurons via NMDA-Rs,
and (2) by increasing the gain of sensory afferents, via the
gamma motor neuron drive to intrafusal muscle fibres (see
Fig. 2). It is likely that CM neurons fulfil both of these
roles [other descending neuromodulatory (e.g. aminergic)
systems that we do not review here will also contribute
significantly to the gain of prediction errors].
Why do we say that the majority of CM neurons could
mediate predictions of precision (gain)? First, this is a
possible role for the 15 % of CM neurons located in area
3a, if they project to gamma motor neurons as Rathelot
and Strick (2006) surmise, although this has not yet been
demonstrated. Second, this could also be the case for the
‘slow’ CM neurons in M1 (the majority), as predictions of
precision are slower than first order predictions, as out-
lined above. Third, it is notable that CM neurons’ EPSPs
are greatest in the very places where the (spinal) stretch
reflex gain is weakest and most in need of supplementa-
tion—the intrinsic muscles of the hand (McKiernan et al.
1998; Ziemann et al. 2004). Last, we would argue that
most of the CM system allows the specification of fine-
grained, fractionated patterns of motor gain (as well as its
first order predictions), in contrast to the diffuse
descending neuromodulation found in other systems
(Heckman et al. 2008). This proposal integrates observa-
tions of the selectivity and focus of CM projections (Buys
et al. 1986; Kuypers 1981) with the gain-like qualities
listed above. Finally, note that like first order proprio-
ceptive predictions, second order predictions of gain will
also be modulated by context, e.g. limb position (Gin-
anneschi et al. 2005).
Sensorimotor cortex: granular versus agranular
The concept of an anatomically discrete ‘motor cortex’,
localised to the precentral gyrus in anthropoid apes by
Sherrington, was first established by Campbell (1905),
using the brain of a chimpanzee that had been one of
Sherrington’s subjects (Macmillan 2012). Campbell ini-
tially studied cerebral myeloarchitecture, noting the
prominent wealth of fibres within motor cortex, and
although he later included cytoarchitectural features, it was
Brodmann’s description of the cytoarchitecture of precen-
tral cortex that gave rise to the description of motor cortex
(areas 4 and 6) as ‘agranular’—i.e. lacking the inner
granular layer, or layer 4 in his terminology (Brodmann
1909/1994). Although the regression of layer 4 has since
been identified as incomplete (Sloper et al. 1979), the gross
architecture of motor cortex is evidently highly differen-
tiated from the adjacent postcentral and frontal cortices.
And yet, however impressive this may be as a carto-
graphical feature, its functional significance has remained
obscure. Why does motor function apparently eliminate
(attenuate) the role played by layer 4? With the foregoing
discussion in mind, we are now in position to examine the
contrasting structure–function relationships within so-
matomotor cortex, granular S1 versus agranular M1.
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The obvious starting point is that loss of layer 4 betrays
the absence of a typical ascending pathway, as seen in
sensory cortices (Shipp 2005). All the sub-areas of S1 (3a,
3b, 1 and 2), for instance, receive various forms of
somatosensory thalamic input in their granular layer
(Padberg et al. 2009). In terms of active inference, sensory
reafference constitutes prediction errors that serve to cor-
rect high-level representations, so refining top-down pre-
dictions and leading to sensory percepts. This is a
hierarchical process, involving repeated input to layer 4 of
the area in a higher tier, and reciprocal feedback of pre-
dictions, as we have previously described. Motor cortex
activity, by contrast, specifies an intended or predicted
movement (goal); this is a fixed entity, relatively resistant
to change, except in its fine details or when expectations
are violated. Proprioceptive predictions become fulfilled in
the course of the movement and thus—in the simplest
possible state—there is no prediction error to travel over an
ascending motor pathway.
This basic intuition has to be qualified, of course, by
the existence of the reafferent sensory pathways to M1
that we have noted above, and the fact that connections
between motor areas are indeed reciprocal. The next step
is therefore to consider how the operations conducted by
these pathways may differ from the standard model set by
sensory cortex. Clearly, it is misleading to suggest that
there is an absence of prediction error reaching motor
cortex, and this is not our intention. Anything about the
motor environment that is inherently unpredictable
(unexpected impacts, deceptively heavy weights, unstable
footing, etc.) will cause error in motor predictions, which
requires correction. Transcortical reflexes, discussed pre-
viously, provide an obvious example. The point to note is
that the motor system strategy is not to pass the sensory
prediction error up through a chain of cortical areas (as if
to modify the intended goal of the movement), but to
react rapidly and reissue modified predictions of the
intermediate states leading to the same ultimate end state.
Let us reiterate the spinal anatomy. M1 does not receive
direct afferents from the alpha motor neurons or inter-
neurons that its corticospinal projections target (as would
be analogous to the descending projections in a sensory
system); rather the proprioceptive reafference percolates
through a complex set of spinothalamic and spino-cere-
bellothalamic circuits, not yet thoroughly documented, but
which would seem to offer a wealth of opportunity for it
to modify descending predictions at a subcortical level; in
other words, the set of spinal and supraspinal reflex arcs
that control muscular tension. This forms a rather marked
contrast to the more direct route followed by primary
afferents along the lemniscal pathway for sensory reaf-
ference to S1. This is the message of Fig. 9: the priority
of somatomotor prediction errors is to cause movement;
the priority of somatosensory prediction errors is to
inform percepts.
In passing, it is also important to note that much of the
corticothalamic traffic in the motor system involves loops
formed with the basal ganglia, and the cerebellum. The
former may operate as an action selection system (Gurney
et al. 2001), and the latter as an integral part of the forward
generative model (see next section). Neither of these loops
is operative within sensory systems, and neither may
require the fine-grained input analysis associated with a
granular layer 4.
Active inference versus optimal control
So what does the active inference formulation offer, in
relation to classical models? One key contribution is to
resolve the hard problem of converting desired (expected)
movement trajectories in extrinsic coordinates into motor
commands in intrinsic coordinates. This hard problem is an
ill-posed inverse problem, conventionally ascribed to an
inverse model in M1. Active inference dispenses with this
hard problem by noting that a hierarchical generative
model can map predictions in extrinsic coordinates to an
intrinsic (proprioceptive) frame of reference. This means
the inverse problem becomes almost trivial—to elicit firing
in a particular stretch receptor one simply contracts the
corresponding muscle fibre. In brief, the inverse problem
can be relegated to the spinal level, rendering descending
afferents from M1 predictions as opposed to commands—
and rendering M1 part of a hierarchical generative model,
as opposed to an inverse model (see Fig. 1).
This division of labour mirrors the distinction made by
Krakauer et al. (1999) between the internal (forward)
model necessary for computing movement kinematics in
vectorial coordinates, and the (inverse) model required for
computing movement dynamics, which takes account of
the biomechanical properties of the arm; e.g. interactional
torques produced by movement of multiple limb segments.
A key difference between our positions is that we locate the
inverse mapping in the spinal cord. The location of an
inverse model in M1 appeals to evidence that M1 neurons
perform computations that are compatible with the outputs
of an optimal controller or inverse model; for example,
some M1 neurons have been shown to integrate multi-joint
torque information (Pruszynski et al. 2011). However,
evidence of this sort does not disambiguate between M1 as
an inverse model and M1’s pivotal role in a hierarchical
generative model. The key distinction is not about mapping
from desired states in an extrinsic (kinematic) frame to an
intrinsic (dynamic) frame of reference, but the mapping
from desired states (in either frame) to motor commands.
Evidence against an inverse mapping occurring in M1 is
provided by Raptis et al. (2010), who elicited different
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EMG patterns following the application of TMS to M1,
while the wrist was maintained in flexion or extension
positions. If M1 produced motor commands—as an inverse
model should—then identical TMS pulses should not elicit
the position-dependent EMG patterns observed by Raptis
et al (although identical pulses might not produce identical
outputs from M1 if the effects of TMS are being modulated
by direct proprioceptive feedback to M1). From the point
of view of active inference, TMS could be regarded as
activating latent (if transient and ill-formed) goals and
subsequent predictions—encoded by populations in M1—
eliciting position-dependent myoclonic responses, via
reflex arcs (and the monosynaptic activation of motor
neurons). The crucial point here is that active inference
works by providing proprioceptive predictions (from a
forward model) to reflex arcs (the inverse mapping), which
automatically generate motor commands.
The idea that neuronal activity in motor cortex encodes
predicted motor trajectories in extrinsic (3D vectorial)
coordinates—as one would expect from a forward model—
is supported by studies which extract kinematic informa-
tion from monkey or human M1 in real time for the control
of computer cursors or robotic devices. One of many
examples is that of Velliste et al. (2008), who controlled
robotic arm movements with electrodes implanted in
macaque M1, using the population vector of neuronal
activity to represent proprioceptive predictions, from which
a robot-derived motor commands to drive movement of its
shoulder, elbow and wrist using inverse kinematics. In
active inference, this inverse process occurs in the spinal
cord—in optimal control, this inversion is assigned to the
cortex. Note that correlations between EMG signals and
M1 activity (e.g. Cherian et al. 2011) do not necessarily
indicate the presence of an inverse model in M1, because
these might be expected if CM (and other) M1 neurons
mediate predictions of motor precision (gain), as discussed
previously.
The circuitry mediating the forward model is potentially
rather broad, utilising the cortico-cerebellar thalamic loop
that includes not only motor and premotor cortex, but also
substantial parts of postcentral cortex, such as area MIP,
recently discovered to receive disynaptic input from cere-
bellum relating to gaze and reach coordination (Prevosto
et al. 2010). The potential role of parieto-cerebellar cir-
cuitry in a forward model of motor control has been well
versed previously (Blakemore and Sirigu 2003; Mulliken
et al. 2008). Interestingly, Mulliken et al. (2008) comment
that ‘‘the encoding of space and time that we observe in
posterior parietal cortex may best reflect a visuomotor
representation of the [movement] trajectory’’ [emphasis
added]: this point supports the active inference view that
the generative model must generate movement trajectories,
not just end-points.
The initial impetus for the development of forward
models in motor control was the realisation that real-time
feedback issuing from S1 to M1 would be too slow to
influence the control of rapid movements. It also follows
that this sensory input to M1 could be of greater impor-
tance in motor planning than in online motor control. One
way of characterising the interplay between S1 and M1 is
that the former models the current body state and the
latter the future (intended) body state; if so, the backward
connections from motor to sensory cortex could aptly be
described as predictions. This could equally include
feedback from premotor cortices to superior parietal
visual areas, predicting the future location of moving
limbs in visual space. A similar argument might account
for the fact that as much as 25 % of the corticospinal tract
originates from postcentral, sensory areas of cortex (Galea
and Darian-Smith 1994). Much of this will represent
descending predictions of cutaneous sensation, and may
act to cancel or attenuate sensations caused by the body’s
own movements, in order to distinguish sensations
resulting from external agencies (Blakemore et al. 2000;
Cullen 2004).
The above argument is based upon the assumption that
pyramidal cells in motor cortex sending predictions to
spinal motor neurons (which do not reciprocate a pre-
diction error) are distinct from those sending predictions
to somatosensory cortex (which do). This is a sensible
assumption in that corticospinal conduction delays require
pyramidal cells driving alpha motor neurons to encode the
causes of sensory consequences in the near future. Con-
versely, the principal cells predicting somatosensory
consequences in somatosensory cortex have to encode
their causes in the recent past. As an aside, these con-
siderations implicitly finesse the problem of conduction
delays in motor control by incorporating them into the
generative or forward model. This is an established
technique in the Bayesian analysis of time series data
(Kiebel et al. 2007). One prediction of this separate pro-
spective and retrospective encoding of movements is that
the prospective predictions, originating in motor cortex
layer 5 pyramidal cells, should not project to sensorimotor
cortex or ventrolateral thalamus. In other words, these
cells should send direct and monosynaptic connections to
the spinal cord and brain stem. This is because the pro-
spective predictions are not suitable for creating predic-
tions of (delayed) sensory input at the thalamic or cortical
level. We could find no empirical evidence that refutes
this prediction.
Active inference and complex movements
It may be thought that active inference implies a stimulus-
driven account of action. However, most behaviour
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comprises spontaneous, itinerant movements—like walk-
ing and talking. Stimulus-driven behaviours provide intu-
itive examples of active inference at work, but endogenous
and complicated sequences of motor behaviour emerge
naturally from priors in hierarchical generative models of
movement trajectories. One example—of generating itin-
erant movement—is that of an agent which learns (and then
reproduces) the doodling-type repetitive movements of a
Lorentz attractor (Figs 14 and 15 in Friston et al. 2010).
Gestures (especially iconic gestures) are a good example
of movements that can be understood under active infer-
ence. A related example here is handwriting (handwriting
is a difficult behaviour to explain using minimisation of
cost functions in optimal control, Friston 2011). Hand-
writing has been simulated using active inference (Friston
et al. 2011), using a simple central pattern generator to
produce prior beliefs that an agent’s finger will be drawn to
an invisible moving target. An interesting aspect of this
simulation was the demonstration that the same central
pattern generator was used to infer movement trajectories
during action observation. In other words, ‘‘exactly the
same neuronal representation can serve as a prescription
for self-generated action, while, in another context, it
encodes a perceptual representation of the intentions of
another’’—as ‘mirror’ neurons do (Friston et al. 2011).
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have argued that the cortex is best regarded
as embodying a hierarchical generative model, whose
descending (efferent) projections predict and explain sen-
sory inputs, thus minimising ascending (afferent) prediction
errors. This view holds that connections mediating predic-
tions should be more modulatory than those conveying
prediction errors, and they should have a similar laminar
organisation, irrespective of the sensory modality being
predicted. These properties accord well with those of
descending projections (from associational to primary cor-
tex) in both sensory and motor systems. This suggests that
descending signals in the motor system are not motor com-
mands but proprioceptive predictions—which are realised at
the spinal level by classical reflex arcs.
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Appendix 1: Clinical insights from active inference
This appendix highlights some clinical phenomena that
shed light on the functional anatomy of motor control. We
do not review motor pathology comprehensively but con-
centrate on areas which could inform—or be informed
by—active inference.
Flaccid and spastic paralyses
Two kinds of paralysis illustrate pathologies of the two
types of descending projections in predictive coding net-
works: those mediating predictions, and those mediating
precision (inverse variance of prediction error) or synaptic
gain.
A severe neck injury can completely obliterate
descending connections from the CNS. The acute conse-
quence is ‘spinal shock’—a flaccid paralysis. In this
instance, both proprioceptive predictions (in the cortico-
spinal tract) and predictions of precision (e.g. innervation
of gamma motor neurons) are completely lost (Brown
1994). Computationally, the absence of precise proprio-
ceptive prediction errors leads to a loss of lower motor
neuron drive and flaccid paralysis.
Conversely, lesions in the cerebral cortex or internal
capsule can result in a spastic paresis, in which some
muscle power is preserved, but—at rest—patients are
hypertonic and hyper-reflexic. In this case, some proprio-
ceptive predictions may reach the ventral horn, but the gain
of the stretch reflex is increased due to a loss of supraspinal
inhibition. Computationally, proprioceptive prediction
errors retain a high precision but are not properly informed
by descending predictions—leading to spastic paralysis. It
should be noted that an increased stretch reflex gain
(mediated by gamma motor neurons) is not the only cause
of spasticity; other causes include mechanical changes in
the muscle itself (Dietz and Sinkjaer 2007) and increases in
the gain of motor neurons (Mottram et al. 2009) following
spinal cord injury.
Proprioceptive deafferentation
One important question for active inference is: if move-
ment depends on spinal reflex arcs, then why can neuro-
pathic patients—who lack Ia afferent feedback from
muscle spindles—still move? Surely, in the absence of
anything to predict there can be no prediction error and no
movement. In fact, the absence of primary afferents does
not mean there is no prediction error—top-down predic-
tions can still elicit alpha motor neuron activity. Under
active inference, a forward model in the brain converts
visuospatial predictions in extrinsic coordinates (low
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dimensional extrapersonal space) to proprioceptive pre-
dictions in intrinsic coordinates (high dimensional propri-
oceptive space). These predictions then leave the brain and
are converted to motor commands by a simple inverse
mapping in the spinal cord (see ‘‘Discussion’’). This spinal
inverse mapping is effectively driven by proprioceptive
prediction errors and corresponds to the classical reflex arc.
A loss of proprioceptive feedback, therefore, will
severely impact upon the spinal inverse mapping, while the
cortical forward model can compensate using visual feed-
back (Bernier et al. 2006). Descending proprioceptive
predictions should still be able to activate motor neurons,
but they can no longer be compared with precise proprio-
ceptive information and cannot be modified by proprio-
ceptive feedback. These predictions are borne out by
empirical studies of deafferented patients:
• Sainburg et al. (1993) showed that two deafferented
patients—miming bread slicing with their eyes
closed—exhibited severely temporally decoupled
movement reversals at the shoulder and elbow joints.
Opening their eyes improved the overall form of the
movement but inter-joint coordination problems
remained.
• Sainburg et al. (1995) demonstrated that the failure to
coordinate the timings of movement reversals was due
to a failure to compensate for interaction torques
transferred to one joint (e.g. the elbow) by changes at
another joint (e.g. the shoulder). They concluded that
the deafferented patients lacked a model of limb
dynamics; i.e. a failure of an inverse mapping.
• Gentilucci et al. (1994) found that a deafferented
patient’s first phase of a reaching and grasping move-
ment was identical to that of control subjects, but the
final phase required frequent movement adjustment.
Furthermore, the patient was unable to compensate for
perturbations applied to the fingers, even with visual
feedback. This indicates that the patient’s movement
planning—i.e. their forward model—is intact, but that
they cannot adjust this plan according to limb kine-
matics, as their inverse mapping is impaired.
Parkinsonian symptoms
We have previously proposed that neuromodulators—such
as dopamine—encode the precision of prediction errors by
altering their synaptic gain (Feldman and Friston 2010),
and hence their ability to effect change within the network.
Depleting dopamine at different levels would alter the
balance of precision at higher (sensorimotor) relative to
lower (primary sensory) levels in the cortical hierarchy. We
have simulated the effects of this loss of precision or gain
in previous publications. These vary according to the site
(hierarchical level) of changes in precision, and include:
• The emergence of quasi-periodic attractors, manifested
as tremor or other repetitive stereotyped movements
(Friston et al. 2010). This model of Parkinsonian tremor
complements that of Helmich et al. (2012), who
propose that Parkinsonian tremor arises from an
interaction between striatal dopaminergic depletion
and a cerebello-thalamo-cortical circuit (the cerebellum
has long been thought to have a role in the temporal
coordination of motor signals).
• A loss of precision of proprioceptive predictions
resulting in smaller movements (hypokinesia), slower
movements (bradykinesia) or loss of movement—
akinesia (Friston et al. 2010; Friston et al. 2012).
• A loss of precision of cue salience can preclude set-
switching, particularly in the context of a hitherto
predictable sequence, resulting in perseveration (Fris-
ton et al. 2012)—also shown in Parkinson’s disease
(Brown and Marsden 1988).
The phenomenon of hypertonia (rigidity) in Parkinson’s
disease is best characterised, conversely, as increased high-
level gain (as opposed to the precision associated with
stretch reflex gain). This could be mediated by a loss of
dopaminergic inhibition of striatal cholinergic interneu-
rons—demonstrated in a mouse model of dystonia by
Pisani et al. (2006)—but there are likely to be other
mechanisms, both spinal and supraspinal (Rodriguez-Oroz
et al. 2009).
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